American University Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 1

Article 2

2014

To Read Or Not to Read: Privacy within Social
Networks, the Entitlement of Employees to a
Virtual Private Zone, and the Balloon Theory
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Yanisky-Ravid, Shlomit. "To Read Or Not to Read: Privacy within Social Networks, the Entitlement of Employees to a Virtual Private
Zone, and the Balloon Theory." American University Law Review 64, no.1 (2014): 53-108.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

To Read Or Not to Read: Privacy within Social Networks, the Entitlement
of Employees to a Virtual Private Zone, and the Balloon Theory
Keywords

Right of privacy, Law -- Interpretation & construction, Implied consent (Law), Social networks -- Law &
legislation, Internet -- Law & legislation -- United States, Discrimination -- Law & legislation -- United States,
Labor laws & legislation -- United States

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol64/iss1/2

YANISKY-RAVID.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

12/9/2014 2:08 PM

TO READ OR NOT TO READ: PRIVACY
WITHIN SOCIAL NETWORKS, THE
ENTITLEMENT OF EMPLOYEES TO A
VIRTUAL “PRIVATE ZONE,” AND THE
BALLOON THEORY
DR. SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID*
Social networking has increasingly become the most common venue of selfexpression in the digital era. Although social networks started as a social
vehicle, they have recently become a major source for employers to track personal
data (“screening”) of applicants, employees, or former employees.
This Article addresses whether this casual business routine harms employees’
rights to privacy with regard to data that users post on social networks, what
the drawbacks of this routine may be, and why and how privacy rights should
be protected to secure private zones within the virtual sphere. The Article
suggests that a privacy right exists within the context of employment, even in
data posted openly on social networking sites. Antidiscrimination laws, the
misleading nature of social networks’ privacy policies, cognitive biases,
unequal bargaining power, the lack of a right to be forgotten, lost control over
data posted by third parties, and psychological reasoning all justify a
reconsideration of the current regime.
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The Article further claims that securing a “private zone” for U.S. employees,
a concept adopted by several other legal regimes, is justified by a bundle of
psychological theories that can be concisely described as the “balloon theory” (or
the “magnet field theory”), which encompasses the importance of a private
sphere that constantly and permanently surrounds one’s persona wherever one
goes—including within the public domain and digital spheres.
In this Article, I call for a re-thinking of the current U.S. regime based on
tort law (expectation test) and contract law (implied consent based on firms’
policies) because the current regime costs applicants and employees a near-total
loss of privacy in their virtual postings.
This Article not only argues for a more balanced approach to employees’
privacy but also suggests a new desirable model for policymakers to adopt. I
propose this challenge be addressed by the adoption of new legal tools.
Implementing the Least Invasive Means—a proportionality standard that
obeys antidiscrimination laws, maintains transparency, and ensures informed
consent and a right to be heard—would lead to a better and more balanced
approach to privacy in the workplace. I also contend that this model may be
implemented to protect privacy rights in data posted on social networks beyond
the context of employment.
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INTRODUCTION
Social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn have
increasingly become a primary venue of self-expression in the
digital era, enabling friends and families to connect and stay in
touch with one another.1
Currently, one-seventh of the world’s population has an account
with Facebook, the most popular social network.2 Almost threequarters of online American adults (seventy-three percent) are
Facebook users.3 Although social networks started in a social context,
they have become, as this Article discusses in Parts I.B. and I.C., a
significant work tool for employers in everyday practice for
“screening” personal data about applicants, employees, or former

1. See Jocelyn M. Lockhart, Facebook as a Job Screening Tool: Are Sales Employers
Discriminating Against Job Applicants based on their Facebook Profiles? 1, 6 (Apr. 2013)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Southern Mississippi), available at
http://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=honors_theses
(discussing the significant growth in the number of employers that use or “always
search” social network data in the hiring process).
2. See Mark B. Gerano, Note, Access Denied: An Analysis of Social Media Password
Demands in the Public Employment Setting, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 665, 665 (2013) (showing
that “[s]ocial media is not only ‘social,’ and isolated to ‘non-business’ settings, but is
also spread across all facets of society”). Notably, blogs have become increasingly
prominent, rising from thirty-six million in 2006 to more than 181 million in 2011. Id.
3. MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE
2013 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/12/PIP_SocialNetworking-2013.pdf.
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employees that is posted on social networks, websites, and in other
virtual spheres. For example, Ellen Simonetti, a flight attendant for
Delta Air Lines, was dismissed after posting inappropriate photos of
herself in the company’s uniform on her blog;4 Stacy Snyder, a
twenty-five year old student teacher, was prevented from obtaining a
full-time teaching position after posting a picture of herself on
MySpace “wearing a pirate hat and drinking from a plastic cup, with
the caption ‘Drunken Pirate’”;5 Marina Stengart, the Executive
Director of Nursing for a home-care nursing provider, had her emails between herself and her lawyer retrieved from her companyissued laptop;6 and Sandi Lazette, an employee with Verizon, had
48,000 personal e-mails retrieved from her former company-issued
Blackberry because the password was saved in the phone.7
This transition has created unexpected results for employees, many
of whom have lost their jobs, been denied unemployment, or
experienced invasions of their privacy while engaged in non-work
activities.8 All of these examples reflect the new era in which people,
including employers and employees, use digital media as an integral
part of everyday life and, more importantly, as a major, yet basic,
means of communication that is preferred to more limiting or
inconvenient traditional alternatives (i.e., sending a paper invitation
or printing pictures instead of posting them on Instagram or
Facebook) as well as a tool for social surveillance.9

4. See Jo Twist, Blogger Grounded by Her Airline, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/technology/3955913.stm (last updated Oct. 27, 2004, 8:30 AM) (explaining
that to Simonetti’s knowledge, Delta Airlines did not have a specific policy
prohibiting the posting of pictures on the Internet or blogging).
5. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0 (detailing how Snyder’s university denied her a teaching degree after
viewing the one picture).
6. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655–56 (N.J. 2010).
7. Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (N.D. Ohio 2013). When
Lazette became aware of her employer’s actions, she changed her password. Id.
Among the contents the employer viewed were communications about Lazette’s
“family, career, financials, health and other personal matters.” Id.
8. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that social networking sites have
emerged as a popular “job-screening tool” and that “employers should be intensely
concerned with [this]”).
9. YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA vii (David Buckingham ed., 2008)
(stating that digital media and networks have recently become a part of everyday life
and the common way to produce communication and knowledge, among other
things); Alice E. Marwick, The Public Domain: Social Surveillance in Everyday Life, 9
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 378, 382 (2012) (arguing that social surveillance is different
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This Article examines the phenomenon and propriety of the
invasion of private data within the context of employment. Is the fact
that digital and web tools are easily accessible enough to justify
surveillance as permissible? Does the feasibility of an action define
and draw the lines between right and wrong or legal and illegal? In
this Article, I claim that guiding principles stemming from social
rationales, notwithstanding technical capability or economic
feasibility, should shape the legal norm and strike a balance between
conflicting interests.
“In the past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike have
embraced the use of computers, electronic communication devices,
the Internet, and e-mail.”10 The overlap between personal spheres
and business life spheres has grown significantly with new
technological developments.11
For example, most, if not all,
employees access the Internet from work for personal use, at least
occasionally.12 However, even an innocuous instance of using a work
computer to check personal e-mail accounts can trigger complicated
legal questions, such as whether employers have a right to monitor
workers’ usage of resources and whether employees may reasonably
expect a modicum of privacy in their personal e-mails.13 In the virtual
spaces of the Internet and its ilk, it is difficult to determine the
border between workplace property and private domains. Moreover,
what is generally accepted as standard means of communicating has
changed drastically in just the past two decades with the rise of
cellular technology and smart phones. In today’s digital age, people
(including job applicants and employees) rely on the virtual space for
essential as well as other types of communications and use e-mail, text
messaging or Short Message Service (SMS), social networks, video
tools such as Skype, chat applications, and other media to keep in
touch. Many employees today carry the newest portable digital
devices, such as mobile phones, tablets, portable computers, or
digital rings, wherever they go, including to work (where they can use
these devices, when necessary, via the employer infrastructure).
Furthermore, employees who spend a tremendous portion of their
waking time at the workplace often have no other practical option
from traditional surveillance (i.e., by the government) in three ways: power,
hierarchy, and reciprocity).
10. Stengart, 990 A.2d at 654.
11. Id. at 654–55.
12. Id. at 655.
13. See id. (opining that the modern workplace and technology present novel
questions regarding privacy and confidentiality).
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than to use their employers’ virtual spheres to access basic means of
communication, either by visiting social networks or writing e-mails.
Employees should not be punished for normative behavior when
working long hours by losing their privacy entirely.
In the digital era, there is a tremendous potential for employees’
use of virtual spheres to put individuals at risk of compromising their
own privacy by exposing themselves to present or future employers.
The discussion of privacy within virtual spheres is unsurprisingly
broad and perhaps even unlimited as it can embrace many venues
and means of employee monitoring.14 One of the most common
violations of employee privacy that has recently increased
dramatically is the tracking of private information posted about
employees on social networks, either by employees themselves or by a
third person, as this Article will discuss in detail.
This Article addresses whether applicants and employees who
actively participate in the virtual world and communicate with others
actually waive their right to data privacy when it is in any way
accessible to their employers. In other words, should the law shield
an applicant’s and employee’s right to privacy within the virtual sphere?
I conclude that there are strong justifications for a paradigm in
which a sphere of privacy would be delineated within the virtual
workplace and provide employees protection from employer
intrusiveness. In other words, employees should have a reasonable
“private zone” within the wired/digital/virtual premises that is not
accessible to their employers—even when they are using corporate
network tools or Internet accounts, even during working hours, and
even more so while not using their employers’ property. I further
claim that under the U.S. regime, the application of an “incorrect” or
“incomplete” traditional legal interpretation to the virtual era has
caused employees in the public as well as the private sector to lose
almost entirely their right to privacy within the workplace.
This Article argues that the loss of employees’ privacy rights under
the present U.S. legal realm within virtual workplaces neither serves a
desirable psychological result nor is well justified by other theoretical
rationalizations and, hence, is not inevitable. Securing a “private
zone” for U.S. employees, a concept adopted by several other legal

14. For example, employers can intervene in employees’ private means of
communication by tracking online activity through surveillance of web postings or by
tracking employees’ locations using the Global Positioning System (GPS) or
voluntary social media “check-ins” in addition to reading private text messages in email accounts or mobile phones and other devices.
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regimes, is justified by a bundle of psychological theories that can be
concisely described as the “balloon theory” (“magnet field theory”), a
theory encompassing the importance of a private sphere that
constantly and permanently surrounds a persona wherever one goes,
including within the public domain and digital spheres. Studies have
shown that providing “private zones” fosters a sense of responsibility
and accountability and, consequently, improves employee
productivity.15 This theory is consistent, but not identical, with laws
and court decisions in some jurisdictions outside of the U.S. that have
found different venues to secure employees’ privacy rights (i.e.,
European Union (E.U.) regulations).16
Some scholars have discussed the question of privacy in the digital
sphere in general17 and in social networks in particular.18 Other
scholars have addressed the question of privacy at the workplace.19
Most of the works are descriptive, revealing the new virtual spheres
and pointing out emerging problems. Some of the scholars have
justified and supported employers’ usage of information posted by
employees. For example, some have explained that using this
15. E.g., CONNOR MILLIKEN, WORKPLACE PRIVACY AND EMPLOYEE MONITORING:
LAWS AND METHODS 4–6 (2012) (reporting on several negative consequences for
companies and employees following monitoring of employees in workplaces, such as
stress and other psychological symptoms that can lead employees to be unable to
work); see also Laura Pincus Hartman, The Rights and Wrongs of Workplace Snooping,
19 J. BUS. STRATEGY 16, 18 (1998) (discussing critiques of workplace monitoring
that suggest monitoring employees leads some employees to suffer’ psychological
and physical problems, such as: stress and tension, anxiety, anger, tiredness,
boredom, and depression).
16. See infra Part IV.B.5 (analyzing the European approach to privacy in the workplace).
17. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 40
(2006) (explaining that a person’s privacy consists of secrecy, anonymity, and
solitude); Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in
Progress, 23 NOVA L. REV. 549, 554–56 (1999) (suggesting that the Internet raises
unique privacy issues).
18. See, e.g., Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of
Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 1, 51–52 (1998) (stressing the importance of controlling one’s online privacy to
meaningfully engage in online social interactions).
19. See Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 64 (2012) (describing the thin line
between private and professional communications while employees are at work and
using employer-provided Internet connections or devices); Paul M. Secunda,
Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279–81 (2012) (questioning
whether public-sector and private-sector workers deserve the same level of privacy at
work); Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace Privacy: We’ll Be Watching You, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 53, 53 (2009) (mentioning that when people voluntarily post information on
the Internet, they are often surprised at negative reactions from employers).
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information in the screening stage provides greater benefits and
efficiencies than the old tools such as resumes and interviews as they
give employers a more honest and candid look at applicants.20 Not
one of these scholars, however, has justified privacy rights in virtual
postings or explained that despite this de facto waiver of privacy in
online posts, most users’ interest in protecting their data is legitimate.
This Article suggests that privacy rights in data posted on social
networks by employees do exist.
This Article not only argues for a more balanced approach to
employee privacy, but it also suggests a new desirable model for
policymakers to adopt. This solution, inter alia, should be part of the
current governmental and policy discourse about privacy protection
within the workplace. The Article concludes with several suggestions
for effectively implementing and encouraging workplace privacy in
this global digital age. Accordingly, I conclude that we should
reconsider the tests relating to privacy in order to secure a “private
zone” within the virtual workplace. A new and necessary policy may
implement other new tests or make use of existing tools, such as the

20. See, e.g., ANDREA BROUGHTON ET AL., THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE
RECRUITMENT PROCESS 19–23 (2013), available at http://www.acas.org.uk/media/
pdf/0/b/The-use-of-social-media-in-the-recruitment-process.pdf
(detailing
the
benefits that employers receive when they use social media to recruit, such as saving
on recruitment costs, targeting specific groups, fostering realistic job expectations,
and improving external communications); Victoria R. Brown & E. Daly Vaughn, The
Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social Networking Sites in Hiring Decisions, 26 J.
BUS. & PSYCHOL. 219, 220 (2011) (advising that even small businesses can use this
method because social media screening is inexpensive); Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging
Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s
Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 559 (2013) (noting the
importance of respecting applicants’ privacy while also highlighting the usefulness of
searching a candidate’s “digital footprint”). But see Donald H. Kluemper, Social
Network Screening: Pitfalls, Possibilities, and Parallels in Employment Selection, in SOCIAL
MEDIA IN HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1, 11 (Tanya Bondarouk & Miguel R.
Olivas-Luján eds., 2013) [hereinafter Kluemper, Social Network Screening] (relaying
that applicants are more comfortable with selection approaches, such as interviews
and tests, and predicting that if applicants become aware that employers have
screened their social network profiles, applicants may turn away from those
organizations); Ann Marie Ryan & Robert E. Ployhart, A Century of Selection, 65 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 693, 698, 704 (2014) (explaining that new data sources, such as social
media, can help with information validity and quality); Juan M. Madera & Wen
Chang, Using Social Network Sites to Investigate Employees in the Hospitality Industry 2 (Int’l
CHRIE Conference-Refereed Track, Paper No. 20, 2011), available at
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/ refereed/ICHRIE_2011/Wednesday/20 (reasoning
that using social networking sites instead of traditional screening methods to select
employees is inexpensive and easy).
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“Least Invasive Means” (the “Proportionality Analysis”), rather than
abrogate employees’ privacy rights, which would have major
implications for employees and, therefore, for workplaces.
In the first Part, this Article describes the virtual sphere inhabited
by employers. It then focuses on the drawbacks of screening data
about employees and applicants, followed by a discussion of
psychological perspectives on privacy within the workplace. The
psychological discourse further refines the distinction between
tangible and virtual workplaces, presenting theories that can be
concisely described as the “balloon” or the “magnet field” theory.
This theory provides for a private sphere that constantly and
permanently surrounds the persona wherever one goes, including
within the public domain, the digital spheres, and the employer’s
“kingdom.” The next Part briefly describes the American legal norm,
leading to the introduction of a contrasting attitude from a different
legal system. This Part suggests policymakers rethink the current U.S.
regime and recommends alternative legal tools they should adopt.
The Article concludes with a discussion of a new trend in recent U.S.
court decisions to protect employees’ and applicants’ privacy rights.
New legislation preventing employers from requesting employees’
passwords to social network accounts, as well as certain court
decisions reflecting the creation of private zones within the virtual
spheres of workplaces, supports this study’s conclusion.
I.

SOCIAL NETWORKS: A VIRTUAL SPHERE INHABITED BY EMPLOYEES
A. Preface

Social networking sites have emerged as a rich source of candidate
information with the tremendous number of online profiles
providing users a forum for interacting through a variety of outlets,
including, but not exclusive to, wall posts, tweets, hashtags, picture
tagging, and the ability to share pictures, videos, and music.21
Facebook, one of the most commonly used social networks today, is a
website that allows its users to create individualized profiles where
they can share status updates, photos, wall posts, and more.22 Users
commonly provide personal private data when they create their social

21. See Lockhart, supra note 1, at 3–4 (illustrating that a candidate’s interactions
on social media can help reveal her true personality).
22. See id. (suggesting that Facebook profiles provide a degree of individualization
that is often a more accurate illustration of candidate’s’ personal characteristics than are
traditional employee-seeking methods, such as interviews or resumes).
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networks’ profiles, such as: their names, leisure habits, party and
drinking habits, gender, age, sexual preference, parenthood or
relationship status; details about their friends, race, language,
location, education, and work history; comments reflecting their
inner thoughts, views, and attitudes; and other personal data.23
Employer use of this data can be contrary to anti-discrimination
laws.24 The public can easily access much of this personal data being
posted in virtual spheres.25
Today, more than one billion people post information about
themselves on social networks; Facebook alone declared 1.23 billion
active monthly users as of December 31, 2013.26 Not surprisingly,
employers have devoured this treasure-trove of information about
that most valuable and unpredictable commodity: the human resource.
Employers review data about potential as well as current employees
both in the course of the hiring process and during employment.27
Daniel Solove has identified four basic categories of activities that
harm privacy interests: “(1) information collection, (2) information
processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.”28
Policymakers should consider these categories when addressing the
boundaries of the permissible regime regarding employer tracking of
personal employee data.
Focusing on data posted on social networks, Patricia Sánchez
Abril, Avner Levine, and Alissa Del Riego described three ways in
which employers are actively screening online employee data: they
are “(1) monitoring and surveill[ing] employee social media profiles,
(2) evaluat[ing] applicants’ social media profiles and online speech
23. Jacqueline C. Pike et al., Dialectic Tensions of Information Quality: Social
Networking Sites and Hiring, 19 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 56, 57 (2013).
24. See infra Part II.A (arguing that determining a prospective employee’s race,
sex, or nationality using social media circumvents Title VII restrictions on asking
questions concerning these protected classifications during interviews).
25. See Pike et al., supra note 23, at 57 (noting that millions of Internet users post
personal information on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn); see also Rebecca Brown &
Melissa Gregg, The Pedagogy of Regret: Facebook, Binge Drinking and Young Women, 26
CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 357, 362–63 (2012) (providing examples of
real posts by women regarding their drinking habits).
26. Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (Jan. 29, 2014).
27. See Ghoshray, supra note 20, at 558 (noting that a candidate’s privacy can now
be invaded “at the click of a mouse,” thus exposing the intimate details of her private
life to potential employers); Pike et al., supra note 23, at 57 (discussing the breadth
of new information available that can be passively observed by hiring professionals
through social media).
28. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 103 (2008) (arguing that
privacy has no single definition but rather is a plurality of different things).
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in making hiring decisions, and (3) limiting employees’ off-duty
online activities.”29 In the twenty-first century, both employees and
employers use the Internet and, more specifically, social media as
substantial tools relative to employment. Employees use these tools
while seeking work, whereas employers rely on social media while
searching for applicants and gathering information about existing
and potential employees.30 Businesses monitor sites like Facebook
and Twitter in search of information that may provide insight about
prospective hires, and individuals can use those sites to learn more
about what it is like to work at a particular organization.31
One of the most problematic and challenging issues relative to the
invasion of privacy is corporate tracking of prospective employees
and their personal information. The next subsection will focus on
this aspect. This infringement of personal privacy starts even before
the hiring process begins: many applicants do not even get a chance
to make a case for themselves to an inquisitive employer because of
this invasion and may never know why they were not hired.
B. Screening Using Social Network Data Prior to Employment
The term “screening” as used by human resource professionals
refers to the digital age hiring process.32 Instead of using old
fashioned and inefficient tools such as resumes and interviews, which
are under applicants’ control, modern hiring managers often rely
significantly on information gathered from the Internet without the
applicants’ awareness or consent.33 How popular are such screening
methods? Research has found that the majority of employers
participating in the studies consider online screening a formal part of

29. Abril et al., supra note 19, at 66–67.
30. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the use of social media as a screening function).
31. See Laura Lagone, The Right To Be Forgotten: A Comparative Analysis 1, 9–10
(Dec. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229361
(explaining that both employers and employees view social media as a valuable tool
during the hiring process but that this creates a conflict between knowledge and
privacy because there is no “right to be forgotten”); see also Abril et al., supra note 19,
at 69 (noting that employers continue to monitor employees’ online activities despite
evidence of adverse effects).
32. See, e.g., Raluca Druta, Cream.HR’s Solution to Today’s Recruiting Challenges,
TECH. EVALUATION CENTERS (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.technologyevaluation.com/
research/article/CreamHRs-Solution-to-Todays-Recruiting-Challenges.html
(suggesting that hiring professionals should screen candidates online at the
beginning of the hiring process and before reviewing resumes).
33. Id.
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their hiring process.34 Sixty-three percent of U.S. recruiters surveyed
have rejected applicants due to online content found in a non-business
context.35 Some companies build candidate profiles for employers using
information on social networks as well as blogs, shopping lists,
participation in events, and memberships in different organizations.36
One study examined the extent to which social networks influence
hiring managers in their decision making.37 The study demonstrated
that a vast majority of the managers who responded use social
networking for recruitment.38 A similar majority, seventy-three
percent, either agreed or strongly agreed that social networking
websites provide meaningful insight into prospective employees.39
Moreover, nearly sixty-four percent of managers surveyed indicated
an interest in using social networking sites for recruitment
purposes.40 However, respondents were almost evenly split as to
whether a rejected applicant has a right to know or should be
informed about the weight afforded to online content in deciding
not to extend a job offer.41 In general, survey participants believed
that content on social networking sites provides meaningful
Accordingly, online
information about potential workers.42

34. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 1 (“An overwhelming eighty-nine percent of
employers are now using social media sites as a means of researching job applicants
throughout the interviewing process.”).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Companies like Social Intelligence Corp. offer employers a “solution” for
applicant assessment and staff monitoring with products that provide a
“[c]omprehensive picture of an applicant’s complete publically available online
presence” and “[m]onitoring for enforcement of company policy and protection
against insider threat.” Employment Background Screenings, SOC. INTELLIGENCE, http://www.
socialintel.com/products-and-solutions/employment.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
37. See Keri Cook, Social Recruiting: The Role of Social Networking Websites in
the Hiring Practices of Major Advertising and Public Relations Firms 9–10 (Spring
2012) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Liberty University), available at http://digitalcommons.
liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=honors (“Twenty-five major
advertising and public relations firms were selected as a sample of the entire
population of such companies. The criteria for selection included a minimum
annual revenue and international status . . . .”).
38. Id. at 13.
39. See id. at 21 (reporting that twenty-seven percent of respondents strongly
disagreed or had a neutral reaction to this statement).
40. Id. at 13–14.
41. See id. at 19–20 (showing that results were scattered between those who strongly
disagreed, disagreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, agreed, and strongly disagreed).
42. See id. at 12–13.
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recruiting is likely to replace more traditional methods of recruiting
through in-person and print ads.43
Addressing management and legal issues associated with using
social media as a tool for recruitment and personnel screening, Ross
Slovensky and William Ross concluded that such use of social
networking sites offers value to organizations, which can gain a lot of
information about applicants by either replacing or supplementing
other information, such as a resume.44 As a screening mechanism,
social media could help alleviate legal concerns about potential
“negligent hiring” claims.
Stating no concern about possible
ramifications of data collection, the authors did name legal
considerations pursuant to the use of such data as a main
disadvantage, advising that companies review their policies and adjust
them to comply with any applicable law.45
Adding to the discourse, Jacqueline Pike, Patrick Bateman, and
Brian Butler have explained why screening is so attractive to
employers and discussed some risks of using information mined from
social networking websites.46 They pointed out that using social
network data is advantageous because applicants are aware of neither
the process nor the outcomes.47 Most traditional screening and
hiring methods use interactive observation tools such as resumes and
formal interviews.48 The main drawback of these approaches is that
43. Id. at 5 (reporting that some scholars have “predicted that online recruitment
efforts will continue to replace more traditional methods such as job fairs, newspaper
ads, word of mouth, and [on-]campus recruiting”).
44. See Ross Slovensky & William H. Ross, Should Human Resource Managers Use
Social Media to Screen Job Applicants? Managerial and Legal Issues in the USA, 14 INFO 55,
58 (2012) (concluding also that social networking sites offer employers a
comprehensive view of applicants and help employers avoid “negligent hiring”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. See id. at 63–65 (advising that managers can devise policies that provide the
firm with appropriate information while respecting applicant privacy and complying
with U.S. legal and ethical expectations).
46. See Pike et al., supra note 23, at 57 (warning that information on social media could
be “outdated, incomplete, or even fraudulent” because it has not been formally submitted).
47. Id. (arguing that passive observation, such as searching a candidate’s social
networking profile, is more informative because the candidate is not explicitly aware
of the observation).
48. Cf. Robert A. Baron, Self-Presentation in Job Interviews: When There Can Be “Too
Much of a Good Thing,” 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 16, 16 (1986) (discussing the selfpreparation necessary for in-person interviews); Robert L. Dipboye & Stacy L.
Jackson, Interviewer Experience and Expertise Effects, in THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW
HANDBOOK 259, 263 (Robert W. Eder & Michael M. Harris eds., 2d ed. 1999) (“An
interviewer seldom acquires information that could not be obtained from the
application and resume.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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candidates know these tools are used for screening and are able to
strategically craft information for their specific audience (i.e., hiring
managers). Employers consider passive observation to be more richly
informative when candidates are not explicitly aware that they are
being observed by potential employers. Nevertheless, employers have
not typically used such passive observation as it is time consuming,
expensive, and sometimes simply impossible to conduct. But times
are changing: employers can observe social networks passively at
relatively little cost and without the candidate being aware of the
observation or its focus.49 Furthermore, since social network data and
postings are persistent, searchable, and replicable, social networks
offer a rich source for hiring professionals confronted with otherwise
limited information for use in assessing the fit between a candidate
and an organization.50
Another empirical study, which examined the psychometric
properties of personality traits (the “Big Five”) assessed through
social networking profiles, illustrates the enthusiasm for online
screening procedures.51
The results included a number of
49. Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked
Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA VOLUME 119, 120,
125–26 (David Buckingham ed., 2007) (noting that so-called “networked publics”
make individuals’ information permanent, searchable, easily copied, and accessible
by “invisible audiences”); Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:
Definition, History and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 213, 220–22
(2008) (reviewing research on privacy issues inherent in social networking sites).
50. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 49, at 220 (discussing how companies gain
meaningful information on naturalistic behavioral data by exploring large-scale
social media patterns); see also Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, PersonOrganization Fit, Job Choice Decisions, and Organizational Entry, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 294, 294–95 (1996) (focusing on the importance of personorganization fit and how certain perceptions of fit are determined).
51. Donald H. Kluemper et al., Social Networking Websites, Personality Ratings, and
the Organizational Context: More Than Meets the Eye?, 42 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1143,
1149 (2012) [hereinafter Kluemper et al., Social Networking Websites] (presenting
findings that suggest social networking data provides consistent, accurate measures
of personality traits and could be used to predict job performance and “hirability”);
see also Donald H. Kluemper & Peter A. Rosen, Future Employment Selection Methods:
Evaluating Social Networking Web Sites, 24 J. MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 567, 573–75 (2009)
(presenting another study demonstrating the usefulness of social networking
websites for predicting future job performance). The study used sixty-three judges
and six subjects and accumulated a total of 378 ratings. Kluemper & Rosen, supra, at
573. The results revealed that the judges were consistent in their ratings of the
subjects’ “Big Five” dimensions of personality, intelligence, and global performance
and were able to differentiate between the top and low performers based on their
Facebook profiles. Id. at 575. The results of the study suggested that social
networking sites might be more reliable than other forms of personality assessments,
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conclusions regarding the reliability, consistency, and validity of
candidate ratings based on social network profiles, finding, inter alia,
that such ratings correlated with job performance, hirability, and
academic performance criteria and that the magnitude of these
correlations was generally larger than for self-ratings.52 The study
suggested that social networks might provide useful information for
an organization but that those organizations must consider the
limitations posed by various legal and ethical issues.53
Indeed, the hiring process is challenging because a lack of quality
information does limit the discovery of a candidate’s true nature,
potentially leading to adverse consequences. “Lost productivity,
wasted time, lower morale, and disruption for clients . . . are just a few
of the negative consequences of hiring the wrong people.”54 While
social networks are potentially useful sources of information, the
information they provide is not submitted by candidates through any
formal established application process. As a result, the information
may be outdated, incomplete, or even fraudulent. This creates a
tension around the quality of social network information: social
networks may often be a rich resource, but the possibility of
inaccurate information reduces the information’s reliability,
increasing the need for employers to make judgments about its
quality. This is part of a larger emerging trend in which employers
must either demonstrate “information self-sufficiency” or take
responsibility for making determinations about a candidate’s quality
based on unmediated information.
Although scholars have
demonstrated a growing awareness of the importance of social
network information in employment contexts, the relevant literature
has largely been limited to anecdotal accounts and speculative
discussions of how social networks might be used.55
such as interviews or resumes, because candidates are more truly themselves on
Facebook than in professional settings. Id. at 570. Facebook reveals enough
information about a person’s interaction with others and personal information to
offer a fairly accurate illustration of an individual’s’ personality. Id.
52. See Kluemper et al., Social Networking Websites, supra note 51, at 1148–49
(concluding from the study that ratings from social networks correlate with a person’s job
performance and “hirability,” meaning social networks are a useful tool for hiring).
53. See id. at 1164 (noting that one legal issue is that while employers cannot ask
questions in interviews regarding their race, religion, sexual orientation, or marital
status, employers can often determine these characteristics through social media).
54. Pike et al., supra note 23, at 56 (adding that the cost of replacing a bad hire
ranges from twenty-five to five hundred percent of that employee’s salary).
55. See Slovensky & Ross, supra note 44, at 55–56 (stating that even though social
networks have become a popular writing topic, there is a lack of academic writing on
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Pike, Bateman, and Butler, while not challenging employers’ data
gathering at all, declared their concern regarding the quality that
results when hiring professionals use social network information.
They pointed out that a lack of quality information inherent in hiring
decisions based on social network data makes it impossible to
discover the true candidate ability prior to employment.56
While risks exist in using social network data, Donald Kluemper
nonetheless found the practice of using LinkedIn or Facebook to
select or reject candidates to be widespread among hiring
managers.57 As an emerging employment selection tool, screening
via social networking sites demonstrates potential as a rich source of
applicant information,58 but research has struggled to keep up with
the rapid changes in social media sites.59 Therefore, Kluemper offers
human resources practitioners a wide range of considerations
toward developing an effective social network screening policy while
also making the case for academics to pursue further research in
this nascent area.60
Undoubtedly, the hiring process has changed dramatically since
the advent of social networks. The position of courts regarding the
validity of employers monitoring and screening would, of course, be
very important. However, since the process of social network mining
for insights on job applicants remains unknown and therefore nonexaminable, there can hardly be cases on point for this issue.
However, tracking data posted on social networks does not end with
the hiring process. Instead, employers review data posted by and
about employees throughout the employment period. This phase
will be the focus of the next subsection.

the advantages and disadvantages of human resource managers accessing applicants’
social media information and seeking to fill that void).
56. See Pike et al., supra note 23, at 57 (categorizing three types of information
quality issues, including accessibility, contextual, and intrinsic quality issues).
57. See Kluemper, Social Network Screening, supra note 20, at 2 (sharing that in a
2009 CareerBuilder.com study, forty-five percent of employers used social
networking websites to research job applicants and that this was a rising number).
58. See id. (explaining that social media screening provides valuable information to
employers such as the applicants’ communication skills, creativity, awards, and accolades).
59. See id. (labeling the use of social networks in hiring decisions as a “rare
moment in staffing research” and “a new paradigm to research”).
60. See id. (noting that this issue is of interest to many disciplines, including
psychology, management, law, and information technology).
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C. Tracking Employee Data on Social Networks During Employment
The practice of tracking information posted by employees on their
private social network accounts gives rise to even more legal
questions vis-à-vis screening because it affects working conditions and
may lead to dismissals and loss of positions. Employees have recently
brought cases—in addition to those described in the first part of this
Article—over dismissals or denials of employment benefits due to
data posted on social networks. For example, Bernadet Guevarra, a
nurse employed at a California hospital, was fired after posting a
Facebook status from her home to various “friends” in which she
virulently complained about having to work on her birthday and on
holidays.61 When one of her Facebook “friends” (a co-worker) shared
the content of these posts with her employer, Guevarra, who had
received no prior notice or disciplinary actions, was first placed on
administrative leave and then terminated the following day.62 Not
only was she discharged, but she was also denied unemployment
benefits—all because of her Facebook post.63 An administrative law
judge and an appellate board reviewed Guevarra’s posts; both found
the posts were a breach of her obligations to her employer and
therefore constituted misconduct connected with employment.64
Guevarra had violated the employer’s policy because her posting was
visible beyond what could be considered “a private communication
conducted outside of work . . . such as one made in confidence to a
family member.”65 Consequently, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the employer’s motion to
dismiss with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.66 The

61. Guevarra v. Seton Med. Ctr., No. C 13-2267, 2013 WL 6235352, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (“Instead of spending my birthday celebrating, I will be working all
night cleaning up feces. . . . Thanks to the [administrator], . . . not only am I
working Mothers [sic] Day, my birthday and my anniversary. And this Friday, I will
be getting the smallest paycheck I had in 12 years due to the 17 percent pay cut we
had to endure.”). The nurse also threatened her supervisors in her Facebook posts. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at *1–2 (reasoning that Guevarra’s Facebook post was more than a
“hotheaded remark” because she had published it to a broad audience,
including co-workers).
65. Id. at *2 (labeling Guevarra’s Facebook statement as “incendiary, derogatory,
and serv[ing] to undermine the morale of the employer’s workforce”).
66. Id. at *8.
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decision, while discussing various legal questions including freedom
of speech, did not mention any privacy issues.67
Other courts have also avoided discussing privacy rights when they
have validated actions against employees based on the employees’
Facebook posts, even those posts believed to be semi-private (thought
to be exclusively available to “friends” or private groups). For
example, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision
written by Judge Richard Posner upheld the lower court’s judgment
in favor of a daycare center that had dismissed an employee on the
basis of hostile and profane Facebook posts.68 The Seventh Circuit
did not challenge the tracking of data on social networks. The court
stated that even if the daycare center’s reason for checking the
employee’s online profile was not a good one, the reason was
irrelevant “if the [c]enter honestly believed that the [employee]
wrote the post.”69
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached a
similar result for the public sector during the same time period. A
police department employee sued the police department, claiming
that she was not promoted in retaliation for Facebook postings in
which she had criticized her colleague for unethically interfering with
her investigation of a person she had arrested for fraud and financial
identity theft.70 Although her Facebook page was set to private, the
court reasoned that her “friends” were able to distribute the
comment beyond the intended audience.71 After reviewing the
Facebook post, the police department launched an investigation,
alleging that the employee had violated the department’s rule
requiring “any criticism of a fellow officer [to] ‘be directed only

67. See id. at *7 (opining that the First Amendment cases Guevarra cited were not
helpful to her case because they involved state actors or private actors who had
opened their property to the public). Comparatively, in Edmonds Dental Co., Inc. v.
Keener, an employee who was fired for using Facebook on company computers—in
violation of a company policy that prohibited using company computers for personal
business—was allowed to receive unemployment benefits in Missouri. See 403 S.W.3d
87, 88–89 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“The conduct for which Mr. Keener was discharged
included using company computers to make posts on Facebook, perform job
searches, and otherwise conduct his own personal business.”). But, he was not
discharged based on the content of the posts themselves. See id. at 88 (remanding
the employer’s appeal due to a question of fact regarding the employment).
68. Smizer v. Cmty. Mennonite Early Learning Ctr., 538 F. App’x 711, 713–15
(7th Cir. 2013).
69. Id. at 714.
70. Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 F. App’x 817, 818 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
71. Id.
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through official department channels.’”72 The court upheld the
lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the police department,
finding that the police department’s legitimate interests in requiring
that any employee grievances be addressed internally and privately
outweighed the employee’s First Amendment rights.73
Further, in Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp.,74 the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey commented that
“[p]rivacy in social networking is an emerging, but underdeveloped,
area of case law” with consistency in case law at two extremes, one
that allows Internet users no expectation of privacy, and the other
that says “there is a reasonable expectation of privacy for individual,
password-protected online communications.”75 The court did not
mention, however, the option of protecting privacy in social network
publications up to a certain level.
II. TO READ OR NOT TO READ? THE PROBLEMS WITH EMPLOYER
INVASION OF EMPLOYEE DATA IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
Given the apparent advantage that employers seem to have over
employees both with respect to controlling the screening process and
in courts, the clash between privacy and the Internet generates a
basic set of legal concerns.
Interesting but problematic
interconnections in relation to employment and social networks can
arise any time before, during, or after employment.
These
interconnections include the following.
A. Disregarding Antidiscrimination Norms
This subsection illustrates one of the main problems that screening
bears: obliviousness to antidiscrimination laws. Antidiscrimination
laws at workplaces are obvious, accepted, and well adopted legal
norms in the U.S. Employers cannot ask job applicants questions
about their sexual orientation, number of children, their religion, or
other discriminative factors, and they cannot base a decision in the
72. Id.
73. Id. at 819–20.
74. 872 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.N.J. 2012).
75. Id. at 370, 373–74. In this case, a New Jersey hospital employee prevailed in
her suit alleging common law invasion of privacy where her employer had demanded
that ‘her co-worker, who had “friend” privileges to ‘her Facebook profile, display the
profile to management. Id. at 370. The employer subsequently took disciplinary
action against the employee on the basis of statements the employer found in her
Facebook profile and which the employee had believed were protected by high
privacy settings. Id. at 370–71.
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workplace on these factors. Nevertheless, employers can easily obtain
this data in the digital sphere and implement biased and discriminative
factors within decisions relevant to job applicants and employees.
Over many years, U.S. law has established and shaped the
framework for antidiscrimination laws in the context of workplaces.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are
prohibited from discrimination based on religion, sex, nationality, or
race.76 Many employer actions and measures are limited and even
forbidden under Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws. The
hiring process is no exception. Therefore, employers cannot ask
applicants or use factors such as race, sex, or nationality, but
employers can easily discern much of this protected information from
data posted on social media, including individual profile pictures.77
Moreover, employers cannot avoid making value judgments about
potential employees, which leads to inadvertent discrimination.
Research shows that most employers form biases when they view
inappropriate content on social networking sites; nearly half of
employers discriminate against individuals whose social networking
content suggests they abuse alcohol or drugs.78 Exposure to this
social network data is irreversible. Once a hiring manager sees a
profile photo, for instance, it may be very difficult to disassociate that
image from the applicant’s name. Use of social media in the hiring
process blurs the lines of existing employment regulations to the
point where they have become ineffective.79
Because of its unique social features, using social networks as
databases for information about job applicants and employees is even
worse from an antidiscrimination law point of view. People use social
networks mainly for social purposes. According to Joy Peluchette and
Katherine Karl, “students make a conscious effort to portray
themselves with a certain light on Facebook.”80 In other words,
76. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012)).
77. See Cook, supra note 37, at 8 (highlighting that every action by human
resources is subject to Title VII, including the hiring process).
78. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 1.
79. See Cook, supra note 37, at 9 (advising that because the use of social media
in hiring decisions is still a gray area, applicants should be especially cautious of
what they post).
80. See Lockhart, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting that students create their desired
images using both comments and photos); Joy Peluchette & Katherine Karl, Social
Networking Profiles: An Examination of Student Attitudes Regarding Use and Appropriateness
of Content, 11 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 95, 96 (2008) (reporting that “[m]ales
[are] significantly more likely than females to place self-promoting and risqué pictures
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individuals’ specific purposes guide the types of material they post
online. For example, those who aim to present a professional image
are unlikely to post the same type of material as those who see
themselves as sexual, wild, or inappropriate and who tend to upload
“problematic” information (from the employer perspective).81
Peluchette and Karl found that “approximately fifty percent of the
students in the study “ha[d] profiles that exemplif[ied] a party
lifestyle . . . includ[ing] profanity as well as comments and photos
involving alcohol.”82 Many students believe that no person who is not
a “friend” will read or view their posts and end up posting negative
content on Facebook. However, the situation is totally different from
this assumption. As stated previously, studies reveal that sixty-three
percent of employers who declared they use social networks in the
hiring process decided not to hire a person based on what they found
on a candidate’s social networking site.83
Antidiscrimination rules trump screening habits and workplace
policy. Employers should be required to follow antidiscrimination
laws when searching and monitoring data in social networks about
applicants and employees. In other words, in accordance with
antidiscrimination laws, screening should not include discriminative
factors, and decisions should not rely on discriminative factors. The
resulting legal complications from making snap judgments based on
social media profiles necessitates employers taking extra precautions
to ensure they do not violate any laws relating to their industry or
geographic location. Companies should ideally establish standard
hiring procedures with reliable techniques for quality candidate
selection, thus avoiding the need to turn to social media.84
To conclude, with decisions based on and biased by prejudice
and unfair judgment, the current situation bears the risk of
illegal discrimination.
B. Misleading Social Network Privacy Policies: Intention and
Expectation of Privacy
The main question that this Article addresses is the contradiction
between, on one hand, social network users’ waiver of privacy by

or comments (involving sex or alcohol) . . . whereas females [are] significantly more
likely than males to post romantic or ‘cute’ pictures and/or information”).
81. Lockhart, supra note 1, at 7.
82. Id. (citing a 2008 study by Peluchette and Karl).
83. Id.
84. Cook, supra note 37, at 9.
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posting on the web and, on the other hand, their claimed right to
privacy in this data as well as the importance of maintaining private
zones in public. Apparently, the discourse about privacy in data
posted on social networks is much more complicated.
The
misleading and vague privacy policies of social network websites is
primarily influenced by their business method, which is to
commercialize the private information posted by users to other
commercial or governmental entities.85 Certain social network
corporations purposely post an unclear and flexible privacy policy
and frequently change the policy.86 This gives great latitude to the
company, enabling it to promote its own interest in gaining profit by
exploiting users’ unprotected privacy.87 A lack of transparency
regarding commercialization of personal data by social network
entities encourages users to post personal data.88 The term “privacy
policy” in itself creates a false illusion of privacy among users who
believe they can protect personal data. For example, student
members of the Queer Chorus at the University of Texas, who kept
their Facebook accounts private, had their sexual preferences

85. See Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Advertising, 81 ADVANCES
COMPUTERS 289, 294 (2011) (noting that social network websites, particularly
Facebook, allow advertisers to target consumers more effectively); Sharon Hannes &
Lital Helman, Corporate Responsibility of Social Networking Platforms 3, 5–11, 13, 16
(forthcoming) (indicating that social networks use personal data for selling
personally tailored marketing messages to commercial entities but keep their privacy
policies unclear to encourage users to provide personal data).
86. Facebook, for example, settled a lawsuit brought by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that alleged it deceived consumers by repeatedly making users’
information public despite having a privacy policy that suggested such information
would remain private. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles
FTC Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises
(November 29, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep. See generally
Fact Sheet 35: Social Networking Privacy: How to be Safe, Secure and Social, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/workplace-privacy-and-employeemonitoring#4a (last updated Aug. 2014) (warning that privacy policies are subject
to dramatic changes).
87. Hannes & Helman, supra note 85, at 12–15 (demonstrating how advertisers use
personal data from social networking sites to more effectively target their customer base).
88. See generally Facebook Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER,
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (noting that, by
preselecting the information a user will share with an application, Facebook
encourages users to allow third party to applications access to troves of information).
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exposed to hundreds of their Facebook friends when the president of
the chorus added them to a public Facebook group.89
Information, particularly photographs, posted by a job applicant or
by third parties in social networks is usually in a context totally
outside of employment, often exhibiting different phases and periods
of the applicant’s life, such as when the applicant was a teenager or
spending time out of the business or educational sphere at parties or
on vacation. As applicants for employment, users of social networks
do not intend to expose their personal lives to potential employers,
yet the unexpected and unintuitive result of creating an account that
is not always protected results in combining multiple pieces of
information together to paint a holistic picture of an individual. In
general, users assume while posting that their data will be exposed
only to the group they intend, especially if they are diligent in
controlling privacy settings. They do not assume it will be disclosed
to third parties such as employers. This issue raises the question of
whether social networking corporations should be responsible for
taking added precautions to ensure employers do not have access to
this data or whether employers should be responsible for exercising
restraint. However, as the previously cited cases90 and scholarship
have established, U.S. employers can and do look at employees’ social
media profiles whether the employees realize it or not.
C. Unequal Bargaining Power
Imagine you are a hopeful job applicant. The employer asks
whether you have social network accounts. You know the purpose of
the inquiry. Assume you have taken cautious steps to protect
information posted by you by making it visible only to “friends.” Even
though the employer does not ask you for your password, you know
that you had better become a “friend” with the employer.91 Due to
the gap in bargaining power between applicant and hiring
employer, the employer in this scenario places the applicant in a
very difficult position.92
89. Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most Personal Secrets Get Outed on Facebook,
WALL
ST.
J.
(October
13,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390444165804578008740578200224
(“The
Facebook
era,
however, makes it possible to disclose private matters to wide populations,
intentionally or not.”).
90. See supra Part I.C (discussing approvals of U.S. courts to dismissals of
employees based on their postings).
91. Gerano, supra note 2, at 665.
92. Id. at 665–66.
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That awkward moment might even evolve into something worse
upon hiring if the employer demands the password to all of your email and social network accounts. Indeed,
there’s really not much difference between demanding the keys to
your apartment and demanding the password to your email or social
media account. In both cases, the other party is demanding the
right to investigate almost everything about you—who your friends
and romantic partners are, what you do when you are not at work
or at school, your health concerns, religious activities and political
affiliations, and much, much more.93

Being aware of this dilemma, Congress and several states have
begun passing laws to forbid employers from requesting personal
passwords from employees.94 Will such laws adequately address the
problem? Due to the unequal bargaining power, the laws may help
but will not cure the entire issue. Job applicants will still face the
dilemma of either voluntarily becoming a prospective employer’s
online “friend” and of exposing their social lives outside of a
professional context or of being excluded from the hiring process.95
Mark B. Gerano examined the extent to which public employers may
investigate the social media content of a job applicant and also
discussed the new legislation about employers’ access to passwords.
He concluded that in some cases (i.e., with police officers) there
should be no restrictions.96
Based on the previous studies discussed, recent technological
changes have made it easier, faster, and cheaper than ever before for
employers to engage in surveillance of their workers.
Many
employers efficiently use technology to monitor and, more
93. Chris Conley, California Social Media Privacy Laws Give Students, Employees
AM .
C.L.
UNION
(Oct.
1,
2012,
11:15
AM),
Online
Rights,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/california-social-media-privacylaws-give-students-employees-online.
94. Gerano, supra note 2, at 675; see Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and
Passwords, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-mediapasswords-2013.aspx (last updated Sept. 28, 2014) (providing descriptions of and
links to state laws that, beginning in 2012, have sought to prevent employers from
requesting job applicants’ passwords). Some states have taken this further. For
example, in 2013, the State of Washington enacted legislation banning, inter alia,
“friend requests” or other access to employee social networking sites by employers.
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.200 (2013).
95. Cf. Gerano, supra note 2, at 666 (highlighting a trend in college sports where
athletes must “friend” a coach in order to participate in the sport).
96. See id. at 667 (arguing that exceptions are appropriate for positions that
would merit thorough background checks, such as police officers and prison guards).
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fundamentally, to control their employees’ behavior at a granular
level that was not previously possible. Compounding the problem is
the indubitable fact that it is hard in these times of widespread
economic distress for employees to take a stand against intrusive
monitoring by their employers.97 As a society, we must consider the
idea that adults passively submit to routine surveillance of their
activities simply “to hold the jobs they need to pay their bills and
provide for their families.”98
Eventually, information asymmetries might cause a market
inefficiency failure.99 Applicants and employees as social network
users are poorly positioned against employers and social network
corporations to take a stand for their rights because of bargaining
power asymmetry and because they lack information.100 In addition,
applicants and employees neither know nor have ways to find out
what personal information employers have gathered or when and
how often the employers will use that information.
D. Cognitive Biases: The False Perception of Privacy
What perceptions and expectations do people—especially young
people—hold regarding privacy on the Internet? Cognitive biases
may serve as the basis of irrational behavior by users who expect
privacy in personal data on social networks. For example, the
“Optimism Bias” can explain the irrational trust a person can display
in third parties relying on an irrational belief that this party would
avoid using the users’ personal data.101 Other biases, such as those
regarding short-term and long-term risk, loss aversion, or crowd bias,
all lead users to fallaciously trust policymakers, social networks’

97. See supra Part I.A–C (discussing the ubiquity of social networking sites and
employers’ use of these sites to screen potential employees).
98. Catherine Crump, Your Boss Shouldn’t Read Your Email, AM. C.L. UNION (July
16, 2012, 5:02 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/your-bossshouldnt-read-your-email.
99. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 47 (4th ed. 2004)
(defining information asymmetries as “an imbalance of information between parties
to an exchange, one so severe that exchange is impeded”).
100. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1250 (1998) (noting that we do not live in a world with “perfect information”
or “perfect competition”).
101. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (explaining that over optimism leads people to
underestimate risk). See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology
of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237, 237–38 (1973) (discussing cognitive biases that
affect individuals’ ability to predict future events).
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fairness, and the law, particularly because most imaginations are
restricted to current known risks.102
E. The Right To Be Forgotten
The recent discussion on the right to be forgotten is relevant to the
discourse about screening and monitoring of digital data about job
applicants and employees:
Unlike paper documents that can be discarded easily, “purged”
electronic documents may still exist in some sort of archival media
where they can stay for an indefinite period of time. Even when
archived tapes are removed for reuse and the information has been
finally overwritten, such documents may still be recoverable.103

The right to be forgotten, meaning a legitimate request for erasing
data, is not recognized in the U.S. Users of social networks in the
U.S. have no legal right to erase data they make available on social
networks. The data remains permanently at the site, even if users
delete it, and even after they quit or disconnect from the social
network services.104 The European Court of Justice’s decision in
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos105 regarding
the right of a user (and the duty of Google Spain) to delete irrelevant
data reveals a totally different point of view.106 The case of data
102. See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in
Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 784 (2003) (discussing the prevalence
of cognitive biases and how they affect decision making).
103. Betty Ann Olmsted, Electronic Media: Management and Litigation Issues when
“Delete” Doesn’t Mean Delete, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 523, 527 (1996).
104. See Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257,
262–69, 270–73 (2012) (arguing that current U.S. laws—such as for intellectual
property, defamation, and tort—do not provide proper control over personal data
and that the traditional First Amendment freedom of speech should prevail); see also
Hannes & Helman, supra note 85, at 5 (reporting that “data provided on social
networks remain with the site permanently”); Lagone, supra note 31, at 1 (comparing
U.S. and European responses to privacy concerns related to social networking and
suggesting that Europe’s proposed “right to be forgotten” could be implemented in
the U.S. without violating the First Amendment (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=15
2065 (May 13, 2014).
106. Id. at ¶ 92 (reasoning that the right to privacy prevails when the information
is “inadequate, irrelevant[,] or excessive in relation to the purposes of the
processing, that they are not kept up to date, or that they are kept for longer than is
necessary unless they are required to be kept for historical, statistical[,] or scientific
purposes”); see also Jeffery Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STANFORD L. REV.
ONLINE 88, 91 (2012) (describing the decision’s “chilling” consequences on social
networks like Facebook as well as on search engines and third parties); Scott D. Goss,
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posted by third parties is even worse, as the user cannot, in many
cases, delete the data even when aware of its presence.107
F.

Data Posted by Third Parties

Users of social networks might control their own posts. However,
third parties post a lot of written and pictorial data. Users essentially
relinquish control over private details about their lives when third
parties post personal information to a social network. Thus,
employees (or future employees) lose control of private details about
themselves. Here, even changing the setting to one of anonymity is
not an option.108
G. Dignity and Psychological Reasoning
Among other risks and harms caused by invasion to someone’s
privacy is the detriment to personal traits, such as autonomy,
freedom, and dignity. People whose privacy has been invaded and
who have had personal information used against them have often
experienced mental injury and helplessness.109 Research suggests

Data Protection Law Errors in Google Spain LS, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de
Proteccion de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzalez, FUTURE PRIVACY F.,
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2014/09/04/data-protection-law-errors-in-googlespain-ls-google-inc-v-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-mario-costeja-gonzalez
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (identifying several potential legal implementation issues
associated with the Google S.L. decision, such as that the data does not disappear but
just makes the search more difficult, and arguing that Google should not be the
“controller” of the process of deleting); Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The
EU Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN.COM (May 13, 2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20140513230300-2259773-whatgoogle-must-forget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten (suggesting that the
right to be forgotten appearing in the European Court of Justice case is focused on
fundamental principle of privacy and raises serious First Amendment questions).
107. Lagone, supra note 31, at 8–9 (indicating that a user has to contact the
company directly to request the deletion of third-party data). Lagone posits that
compliance with such a request effectively turns a purportedly neutral company into
a censor. Id. at 9.
108. The Facebook privacy policy describes the ripple effect of third party posts,
tags, “likes,” and other interactive tools. Sharing and Finding You on Facebook,
FACEBOOK.COM, available at https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-onfb (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
109. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087
(2001) (discussing the “sense of violation” Monica Lewinsky must have felt when her
private sexual life was “forcibly made public”); see also James P. Nehf, Recognizing the
Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (describing the
sense of helplessness that results when strangers collect and have the ability to use
private information against an individual).
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that, in the workplace, employees who feel their employers have
breached their trust may experience emotional distress, feelings of
betrayal, anger, and other emotions that affect their overall behavior
and sense of loyalty to the organization.110
Acknowledging these problems, we have to understand the value
behind the right to privacy. The Article thus now turns to a
discussion of a psychological approach as the main source of the
right and justification for its protection.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY “BALLOON” OR “MAGNET FIELD” THEORY
A. Introduction
“I felt total incomprehension, I was stunned,” said Ms. Paulin, a
twelve-year employee of the Swedish home furnishings group IKEA
and its Deputy Director of Communications and Merchandising in
France when she was forced out of her job after the company was said
to have provided her Social Security number, private cell phone
number, bank account details, and other personal data to a private
detective and then accused her of falsely claiming to be ill.111 She
left the dismissal meeting emotionally disturbed and felt her soul and
her dignity had been breached.112 A few days later, Ms. Paulin
attempted suicide.113

110. See, e.g., Sherri Coultrup & Patrick D. Fountain, Effects of Electronic Monitoring
and Surveillance on the Psychological Contract of Employees: An Exploratory Study, 19 PROC.
ASBBS ANN. CONF. 219, 222 (2012) (presenting several such studies).
111. Nicola Clark, Revelations that Ikea Spied on Its Employees Stir Outrage in France,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/business/
international/ikea-employee-spying-case-casts-spotlight-on-privacy-issues-infrance.html?pagewanted=all.
112. Id.
113. According to one report of this incident,
One of the emails from [Ikea France’s head of risk management], dated
Dec. 11, 2008, was addressed to a private detective, Jean-Pierre Fourès. He
was asked to confirm whether Ms. Paulin had traveled to Morocco over the
preceding several months and if she owned property there.
Mr. Fourès’ reply confirmed both to be true and included a startling
attachment: scanned images from Ms. Paulin’s passport, showing her
Moroccan entry and exit stamps. To obtain those, the court documents
show, Mr. Fourès had arranged for someone posing as an employee of Royal
Air Maroc to persuade Ms. Paulin to fax copies of her passport in order to
claim a free ticket offer. . . . Subsequent messages to the detective also
disclosed details of Ms. Paulin’s personal bank account.
Id. Furthermore, “The going rate charged by the private investigators was 80 to 180
euros, or $110 to $247, per inquiry, court documents show. Between 2002 and 2012,
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IKEA’s investigation was not the result of coincidence. It was
designed to gain personal information about employees and job
applicants, to store the information, and to use it against the
employees when necessary.114
The abundant diversity of Internet and virtual tools provides more
than just a new means of expression. The pervasive use of virtual
instruments such as e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Skype, and
others, combined with the growing popularity of these tools among
future employees, reflects a new reality. Access to culture, education,
knowledge, and human relationships are conducted primarily by
active and constant use of these virtual instruments.
Indeed, digital technology has revolutionized the vehicles of social
interaction. Future generations of employees, such as students,
are cognizant of their reputational vulnerability on digital media
but are not willing to sacrifice Internet participation to segregate
their multiple life performances. Lacking the technological or
legal ability to shield [certain aspects of their lives that might once
have been exclusively private], Millennials rely on others, including
employers, to refrain from judging them across contexts.115

In other words, “[d]espite granting employers access to information
about their private lives by participating online, respondents expect
that work life and private life should be generally segregated—and
that actions in one domain should not affect the other.”116
Furthermore, portable electronic devices are now pervasive and
increasingly dominate everyone’s life.117 Some people who are aware
of the potential outcomes of a possible violation of their privacy pay a
the finance department of Ikea France approved more than €475,000 in invoices
from investigators.” Id.
114. The case caused public outrage in France because it “occurred in a country
that, in the digital age,” was reported to pride itself on having “elevated privacy to a
level nearly equal to the national trinity of Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité.” Id.
115. Abril et al., supra note 19, at 66.
116. Id. at 66–67 (describing the paradoxical expectation of privacy among
millennial employees—they generally want privacy yet still share personal
information online aware it may be available to employers).
117. See Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 323, 326 (2012) (arguing that the rise to ubiquity of portable electronic
devices—Blackberries, iPhones, iPads, Androids, and etcetera—blurs the workspace
with private spaces, blends work-time and private-time, and calls for a re-thinking of
traditional distinctions and a new emphasis, not on employees’ reasonable
expectations but, rather, on employers’ reasonableness in monitoring workers). But
see United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no
objective expectation of privacy in a workplace computer where the employer’s
policy included monitoring provisions).
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price by avoiding any kind of Internet expression, becoming virtually
paralyzed, and choosing to stay behind as popular means of
communication advance.118
Whether employers’ common practices of tracking employees’
private information within the virtual sphere is desirable can be
discussed from several points of view. The following section will focus
on the psychological need for privacy.
B. The Psychological Importance of Privacy
Virtual tools play an essential role in the definitions of a person’s
identity, “self,” “self-expression,” and “self-identification.”119 Works
about intrinsic motivation, from the psychological perspective, reveal
that privacy is a notion perceived entirely within a person’s
consciousness and not in the external world.120 Therefore, the
perceived notion of privacy is equally relevant in virtual spheres as it
is in other spheres where it is already recognized. The virtual spheres
influence this consciousness of privacy because privacy does not
depend on or stem from tangible assets or physical reality. Privacy
actually exists within our minds and souls. Privacy is the way we
perceive privacy. In other words, privacy is an internal illusion and
it is intangible. Social media is also intangible. Thus, it does not
make sense to try to think about privacy in terms of tangible
spheres only. Quite the contrary, privacy matters might be more
important and more suitable to the virtual intangible spheres.
Differentiating between tangible and virtual spheres and their
legitimate influences on the privacy rights discourse or on an
expectation of privacy may be misleading.
Perceiving consciousness as the intermediary between the cause of
violated privacy and the psychological outcomes thereof (as has been
made in legal literature) justifies the interconnection between the
right to privacy (including within a virtual sphere) and important

118. Hannes & Helman, supra note 85, at 13–15 (describing the future harm of
people avoiding posting personal data from a different perspective because of firms
that do not internalize privacy matters).
119. Green, supra note 117, at 339–40 (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619, 2630 (2010)).
120. See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Introduction, in OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS 3, 10, 17 (Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
& Isabella Selega Csikszentmihalyi, eds., 1988) (describing consciousness as “an
informational system that could differentiate among a great variety of stimuli, that
could choose certain stimuli and focus selectively on them, and that could store and
retrieve the information in a usable way”).
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values embedded in psychological concepts such as freedom, dignity,
autonomy of the persona, selfhood, and human relations.121
Scholars and jurists have suggested many definitions of privacy
without having settled on any one as the “right one.”122 From a
psychological/personhood perspective, privacy is the personal
information and emotions that remain personal when the person is
exposed in public. It can also be considered the ability of individuals
to differentiate themselves or information about themselves and
thereby reveal themselves selectively to others. We refer to private
“issues” as information that is considered emotionally or personally
sensitive or inherently important or special.123
The levels,
boundaries, or content of what is considered private differs among
situations, cultures, and individuals but shares basic common themes.
One of them is the wish to remain unnoticed or unidentified in the
public realm: anonymity.124
C. The Balloon/Magnet Field Theory
The sphere of privacy consists of our perceptions about
information and emotions. This can be analogized to the concept of
an intangible “balloon” (or magnetic field) that always accompanies a
person wherever she goes within the public domain, including during
perceived or actual interactions with others. The size of the
“balloon” differs according to the interaction. When we are with

121. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 17, at 40 (citing Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980)); see also Gary T. Marx & Sanford
Sherizen, Monitoring on the Job: How to Protect Privacy as Well as Property, 89 TECH. REV.
62, 63 (1986) (“Privacy is an essential component of individual autonomy and
dignity. Our sense of liberty is partly defined by the ability to control our own lives—
whether this be the kind of work we undertake, who we choose to associate with,
where we live, the kind of religious and political beliefs we hold, or the information
we wish to divulge about ourselves.”).
122. The most famous definition is “the right to be let alone.” Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
123. SOLOVE, supra note 28, at 34–35 (discussing theories that consider privacy a
type of intimacy).
124. See Jed Rubenfeld, Anonymity and the Digital Revolution 1 (forthcoming) (on
file with author) (differentiating anonymity and privacy and pointing out legal
difficulties associated with anonymity). But see Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy:
The Behavioral Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 82, 82
(2009) (noting that “many seek notoriety at the price of embarrassment, a tarnished
reputation, or even infamy”); Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy
and the Control Paradox, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340, 345 (2013) (finding
that people tend to release more private information when they exercise greater
control over its release).
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family and friends, we consciously shrink the “balloon” and share part
of it with them. When we are with strangers or employers, we save
the “balloon” in order to preserve our personal sovereignty. Each
person may choose the time, place, and level of disclosure of
personal information, experience, and emotion as well as the
company before whom such disclosures are made.
The state of privacy is related to the act of concealment.125 The
reality of employees staying at the premises of employment and using
the employer’s tools—both tangible tools such as computers and
virtual ones such as Internet accounts—is a classic example of the
balloon theory in action: where the need to protect privacy is
generated by a situation or encounter. Persons differ from one
situation to another.126 Different sets of social norms control distinct
social settings.127 Thus, among friends and family, one acts according
to one set of social behaviors, whereas the same behavior is not
acceptable in a different setting and may be subject to sanction for
visible deviation from patterned role behavior.128 While drinking with
friends or at a festive celebration is welcome, drinking at the
workplace or while driving is typically punished.
Today, the Internet has blurred the borders between social
contexts and mixed these different situations, creating a blend, and
sometimes a clash, of rights and wrongs. It is acceptable to take
pictures with friends at a costume party, but once posted on the
web, those same pictures can bring about a person’s dismissal. A
person should have adequate freedom to build the “self” and to
choose how that self will be represented. Similarly, this choice
requires that individuals be able to limit others’ access to aspects of
their online persona.129
In contrast, one of Jed Rubenfeld’s main claims is that privacy
exists within a private sphere.130 This idea is based on the traditional
125. See Brandimarte et al., supra note 124, at 340 (describing privacy decision
making as suboptimal and as having “perverse effect[s],” causing individuals to reveal
less in less risky situations and reveal more when such revelations could be risky).
126. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Will the Wolf Dwell with the Lamb? Psychological
Relationships in the Workplace, in LIBER AMICORUM ELISHEVA BARAK-USSOSKIN 233, 235–
38 (Guy Davidov & Guy Mundlak eds., 2012).
127. Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 307, 308 (1966).
128. See id. (noting that deviation from social roles may result in criminal
punishment, social banishment, or a label of “mentally ill”).
129. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 17, at 40.
130. Rubenfeld, supra note 124, at 3 & n.5 (differentiating between privacy in
private and the lack of privacy in public).

YANISKY-RAVID.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

TO READ OR NOT TO READ

12/9/2014 2:08 PM

85

distinction that led to the famous U.S. Supreme Court statement in
Katz v. United States131 that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”132 I suggest that the real meaning of privacy
does not exist when others are not around, as the meaning of privacy
and the need for privacy is established when other people may be
perceived as invading into this conceptual privacy sphere. This
invasion can be physical, such as seizure, scrutiny, or rape, but most
of the time it happens when others find personal information (e.g.,
surveillance or tracking of personal data) or ask personal questions
(e.g., investigation). Privacy, then, is the outcome of a person’s wish
to withhold from others certain knowledge as to her past, present, or
future.133 The concept of privacy as intrusion upon seclusion is too
narrow and inaccurate and misses the more conflicting and more
common intrusion that, according to my claim, should be
protected.134 Therefore, the classic traditional definition of privacy as
“the right to be let alone”135 should be adjusted to recognize a
protected sphere against disclosure of certain facts within any public
realm.136 This shift from the state of merely alone to the protection
of one’s personality explains and justifies privacy in the virtual
spheres.137 “Although the home is the quintessential ‘private’ space
131. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
132. Id. at 351.
133. Jourard, supra note 127, at 307 (noting “[t]he wish for privacy expresses a
desire to be an enigma to others or, more generally, a desire to control others’
perceptions and beliefs” by monitoring the exposed information about one’s self).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2012) (“At the core of the privacy concern is information about the person—
information that the person wishes to shield to a certain extent, if not completely.”).
The vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted four common law privacy torts: “(1)
intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity placing a
person in a false light, and (4) misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness.” Id.
William L. Prosser initially described these four contexts. William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Tort law is different from employment law as
employees and employers are contractual partners. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.01 reporters’ notes, cmt. a.
135. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 122, at 193.
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 7, intro. note
(explaining the “right to be left alone” as the “right to keep certain areas and
activities free from intrusion by others” and protected against outside interference as
some activities are sufficiently part of an individual’s personality).
137. See id. § 7.01 reporters’ notes, cmt. b (noting that whereas “[t]he intrusionupon-seclusion tort has played an important role in the protection of privacy in the
employment context” in the U.S., “the tort is not limited simply to the employer’s
observation of the employee’s home, or the employer opening employees’ mail”).
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in the American legal lexicon, employees have important privacy
interests in their private information” outside of the home, too.138
D. Personal Health and Welfare
People generally maintain better physical, psychological, and
spiritual health when they have private space—“some locus that is
inviolable by others except at the person’s express invitation.”139
People disclose themselves to those they trust, and it is reasonable
to expect trust to be built before the disclosure. Nevertheless,
electronic
communication
is
different
from
traditional
communication. Writing by computer or keypad is perceived as
impersonal.140
Consequently,
electronic
“messages
are
depersonalized,” often resulting in “stronger or more uninhibited
text and more assertiveness in return.”141 In other words, today’s
electronically transmitted communications are more likely than
traditional forms of communication to be even more personal and, as
perceived by the creator, private in nature. Yet, “[d]espite documented
adverse effects” from psychological and business perspectives,
employers continue to routinely monitor their employees.142
E. The Efficiency Advantage of Privacy
Having a private sphere in the workplace might bring better results
from the employers’ point of view. In place of suspicion and mistrust,
privacy and trust might encourage employee motivation, followed by
higher productivity levels, an improved sense of responsibility toward
work, an increased likelihood of employee initiative, and improved
worker health.143 This would advantage not only the employer but
society as a whole.144

138. Id.
139. Jourard, supra note 127, at 310.
140. Sara Kiesler et al., Social Psychological Aspects of Computer-Mediated
Communication, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1123, 1125 (1984).
141. Id. (positing the use of electronic communication brings new social
psychological norms of behavior because of the associated feeling of anonymity).
142. Abril et al., supra note 19, at 69; Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping
Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J.
285, 286 (2011).
143. See Ciocchetti, supra note 142, at 286–87 (noting that excessive employee
monitoring may lower employees’ trust in their employers and decrease morale); see
also Ethan S. Bernstein, The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational
Learning and Operational Control, 57 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 181, 205 (2012) (suggesting that
creating “zones of privacy” may improve performance); Jourard, supra note 127, at
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IV. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL TOOLS
Given an understanding of the right to privacy as framed by the
above-mentioned justifications, policymakers and scholars ought to
re-think the current legal regime regarding employee privacy within
the digital sphere in general and with respect to data posted on social
networks in particular, using modern principles to replace or at least
reshape the traditional approach. The new tools suggested herein
leave enough room for judicial flexibility to respond in a world of
constant and often rapid changes. First, this Part describes the
traditional approach that led to the new reality of an almost total loss
of privacy for information posted on social networks about applicants
or employees in both the public and private sectors. This is followed
by a description of suggested legal principles that should govern
employee privacy rights and shape its limits.
A. Status Quo: Oppression of Employee Privacy in the Virtual Sphere
Current prevailing practice regarding privacy at the workplace
often exposes American employees to trespass by their employers via
the unwelcome reading of private e-mails or text messages in mobile
phones and other devices, tracking of employee location, tracking of
Internet activities, and surveillance of social network postings (e.g., on
Facebook). Indeed, courts and lawmakers around the world are “having
trouble conceptualizing privacy in new technologies.”145 The prevailing
attitude in the U.S. is that the digital sphere (i.e., social networks) is not
protected from employer intrusion of employee privacy.146
By applying an “incorrect” or “incomplete” traditional legal
interpretation to the virtual era, the U.S. regime has caused
American employees to almost entirely lose their right to privacy
within the workplace. The reasonable expectation of privacy test
308 (arguing that, in order to avoid the punishment that results from deviating from
one’s role, individuals have an interest in their outward appearances).
144. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901,
931 (2012) (“Because employee privacy plays a crucial role in nurturing socially
valued employee speech, protecting that privacy also promotes the broader public
values advanced by that speech.”).
145. See Abril et al., supra note 19, at 65 (“The shared unease among lawmakers
around the world suggests that they need more information to gauge privacy and
behavioral norms for new technologies.”).
146. See Fact Sheet 7: Workplace Privacy and Employee Monitoring, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/workplace-privacy-and-employeemonitoring (last updated Aug. 2014) (warning that company e-mail, private e-mail,
and instant messaging applications, if accessed through a company terminal, are
subject to monitoring).
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implemented by the public sector virtually eliminates employees’
privacy rights when applied within a modern virtual workplace
realm.147 The same drained privacy rights result has been diagnosed
in the private sector by Christine Jolls, who found that nongovernmental workers overwhelmingly lose their rights when courts
apply a test that examines explicit or implicit consent because all
employees “agree” to waive the right to privacy.148 Therefore, moving
toward “opt-in” employee “consent” policies would not change this
result. Even in cases where courts have respected an employee’s
privacy in a private sector job, they have not held that employers
cannot monitor or regulate the use of workplace computers. Instead,
they have held that companies can adopt and enforce lawful policies
relating to computer use to protect the assets, reputation, and
productivity of a business, to ensure compliance with legitimate
corporate policies, and to enable employers to discipline or
terminate employees for violating workplace rules that are not
inconsistent with a clear public policy mandate.149 The outcome is
that employees have almost totally lost their privacy rights within the
virtual spheres of workplaces.
Consequently, the current U.S. legal posture, stemming mainly
from court decisions that distinguish between privacy within tangible
premises of the workplace and virtual spheres, should be
reconsidered and refined. The traditional test, as set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Ortega,150 should be applied to
today’s virtual workspaces extending the law so as to integrate it with
the realities of the digital era.151 The employee expectation of privacy
test as well as other contract and tort theories should be either
replaced or adjusted to this notion of virtual workplace privacy zones.

147. For an explanation of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, see infra
note 153 and accompanying text.
148. Christine Jolls, Privacy and Consent Over Time: The Role of Agreement in Fourth
Amendment Analysis, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1693, 1696–97 (2013).
149. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 21 (N.J. 1992)
(holding random drug testing of employees in positions that could affect public
safety does not violate public policy); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d
1257, 1258 (N.J.) (holding enforceable against an employer an implied promise in
an employment contract that employee may only be fired for cause), modified, 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512–13 (N.J.
1980) (holding that an employee must identify a specific public policy that was
violated by termination before she or he can prevail in wrongful discharge action).
150. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
151. See id. at 718 (recognizing that employees’ tangible workspaces—such as
desks, cubicles, or offices—in a public workplace may be deemed private spaces).
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1.

The governmental sector
American law differentiates between employees who work in
governmental institutions and those who work in the private sector
because the U.S. Constitution (specifically, with respect to privacy by
its Fourth Amendment) limits the government, including in its
capacity as an employer.152 Public sector monitoring of employee
usage of employer Internet tools and other communication devices is
subject to a test of the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy,153
whereas private sector workers are governed mainly by explicit or
implicit contracts.154 The prevailing attitude in the U.S. workplace
and courts is that e-mail privacy (and general Internet usage less
explicitly) and tracking of private information on employee Internet
posts is not protected, whether originating in the physical workplace
or from the virtual sphere, and especially when employees use
employer computers and networks. Courts have held that employees
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail or other
electronic communications, and federal law is limited and generally
leans away from affording employees privacy, especially when it
comes to the specific issue of e-mail.155
Physical instruments and spaces have traditionally defined privacy
law in the United States. The reasonable expectation of privacy

152. That distinction notwithstanding, the practice of permitting employer
intrusion upon employee electronic communication and digital tool usage is
prevalent within both sectors. See Secunda, supra note 19, at 278–82 (offering a clear
delineation of the differences between the private and the public employment
sectors and arguing that there are sound public policy interests in providing greater
protection for government workers).
Absent government intervention or
involvement as an employer, the law affecting private employers and their employees
is based mainly in tort and is evolving. Id. at 279.
153. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” (emphasis added)). But the Court
subsequently held that privacy rights “do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation,”
noting that common law understandings of trespass, including the particular
concern of “government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and
effects’) it enumerates,” was not repudiated by Katz but, rather, supplemented by the
ruling. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
154. See Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law 11–14 (Dec. 10,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/Faculty/Jolls_RationalityandConsentinPrivacyLaw.pdf (discussing cases where
consent to various terms of employment bound consenting employees).
155. Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace Privacy: We’ll Be Watching You, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 53, 67–68 (2009) (suggesting that although federal laws “appear to protect
employees’ e-mail privacy, they generally do not”).
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analysis, endemic to privacy jurisprudence, is firmly rooted in the
experience of physical space and its surrounding normative
circumstances. Policymakers have thus far failed to adjust privacy
norms to the new reality that most workers function within a virtual
sphere in a way that at least partially protects individual privacy.
2.

The private sector
The public sector reasonable expectation of privacy test nearly
eradicates employees’ privacy rights when applied within a modern
virtual workplace realm.156 The same result of drained privacy rights
has been diagnosed in the private sector by Jolls, who found that nongovernmental workers overwhelmingly lose their rights when courts
apply a test that examines explicit or implicit consent since all
employees “agree” to waive the right to privacy.157 “Consent” policies,
clearly, are not the answer to safeguarding employee privacy rights
within virtual workplaces.
Chapter seven on Employee Privacy and Autonomy of the
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law summarizes the legal rules
concerning employee privacy in the private sector.158 The legal rules
are based mainly in two fields. One is the law of contracts, in which
the most relevant legal tool is the employer policy.159 The contracts
law regime views company policy (often expressed in the form of an
employee handbook) as a valid contract, subject to the general
conditions that validate contracts.160 Employees often give implied or
explicit consent to surveillance by their employer or prospective
employer, even though using social media to screen job applicants
may not meet the condition of a contract when applicants do not
know that their data is being scrutinized at this stage.161 The other

156. See Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee
Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 979, 1016 (2011) (“Absent specific state laws limiting intrusive employee
monitoring—which tend to be few and narrowly drafted—employers are free to
destroy U.S. employees’ expectations of privacy via detailed notices, and without an
actual expectation of privacy, employee privacy is not protected against monitoring
under federal law and general state privacy laws.”).
157. Jolls, supra note 154, at 11–14.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 7, intro. note (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2012).
159. Id. § 3.01 cmt. e.
160. Id.; see also Jolls, supra note 154, at 11–14 (noting that courts often view
consent to terms of employment as binding on the consenting employee).
161. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 cmt. j.
(discussing express and implied privacy policies).
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realm upon which employment privacy laws draw heavily is the law
of torts, from which the expectation of privacy test is drawn. This
brings the public sector test to the private sector.162 The ultimate
result in both employment sectors is the same: employees maintain
no actual protection of their privacy with respect to personal data
on social networks.
B. A New Horizon: Alternative Legal Tools
The importance of privacy rights does not skip over employees in
the workplace. It is time to reconsider the legal tools and privacy
policies within workplaces in order to secure “private zones” for
employees using the virtual sphere, such as within social networks.
The mere existence of technical surveillance tools capable of
tracing and tracking personal data does not make the use of those
tools to violate privacy a permissible norm. There is a gap between
what can be done technically and what should (or should not) be
done. Bringing American policy in line with the realities of digital
age society will benefit employers by fostering trust, encouraging
workplace creativity, and improving productivity. According to the
main principle of this Article—that employees have the right to a
secured “private zone” that protects data about them posted on social
networks—policymakers should re-think the existing legal tests and
consider replacing them with alternative tools that balance legitimate
interests with employee rights.
1.

Obeying other laws: Antidiscrimination laws
Any employer action, including an instance of legitimate
surveillance, is subject to existing laws, including antidiscrimination
laws that are applicable to workplaces.163 The fact that certain
information is accessible and easily read does not justify the violation
of antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, employers should not look
for discriminative data. If seen, it should not be taken into
consideration in hiring, promoting, or firing employees or in any
other workplace context. For example, information about gender,

162. See id. (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to hypothetical
workplace scenarios).
163. See supra Part II.A (explaining that while employers cannot overtly
discriminate against job applicants by asking them certain questions, they can
uncover information about private data in the virtual sphere).
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age, sexual preference, or religion should be irrelevant to the
workplace in most cases.164
The same rule that prevents employers from asking applicants
questions about their sexual habits165 should be applied in the
context of social networks. Given the accessibility of information in
social networks, combined with the discriminatory nature of some of
the information typically posted and the irreversibility of exposure to
such data, online profile tracking should be permitted only when
necessary to achieve specific legitimate goals. Therefore, “red lines”
that limit the tracking and the usage of social network information
should be established.
2.

Transparency and informed consent
Current employees as well as applicants should not only be aware
of an employer policy and its effects, but they should also explicitly
agree to it. Therefore, as a first step, employers should adopt a
transparent policy regarding privacy at the workplace that conforms
to all other conditions described in this subsection. This policy ought
to be written, clear, detailed, and include, inter alia, the different
aspects of privacy incursion by the employer, including Internet
surveillance on social networks, e-mail monitoring, and computer
usage. It should be published and accessible to all applicants and
employees. If the company has an employee handbook, the policy
should be included. However, all of these measures, which represent
today’s norm relating to privacy policies at workplaces, are necessary
but not sufficient to create a valid agreement concerning employees’
privacy rights in the virtual sphere. Applicants and employees should
explicitly agree to data tracking (under any of the different
conditions) and should have a right to refuse these actions.166
One of the most important components of a reasonable privacy
policy is employee consent. However, there are several levels of
164. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)) (providing exceptions
for, inter alia, bona fide occupational requirements, certain religious schools, and
national security positions).
165. See, e.g., Best Practices for Employers in a Hiring Interview, FINDLAW,
http://files.findlaw.com/pdf/smallbusiness/smallbusiness.findlaw.com_employment
-law-and-human-resources_best-practices-for-employers-in-a-hiring-interview.pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2014) (noting that such questions are not only in bad taste but also
run afoul of state or federal antidiscrimination laws).
166. See generally Jolls, supra note 154, at 21 (comparing drug screening cases in
which employees complain about positive results and cases in which employees
withdraw their agreement prior to testing).

YANISKY-RAVID.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

TO READ OR NOT TO READ

12/9/2014 2:08 PM

93

consent. The first is implied consent, derived from the existence of
the employee—employer relationship. The second is informed
consent, created by potential or actual prior knowledge about the
privacy policy. The third is express consent, in which employers
obtain employees’ informed, willing, written, and signed consent to
any invasion of privacy. In order to meet the “informed signed
consent” requirement, the employer must disclose to the employee,
in writing, the matters set forth in the policy, such as the nature of
any monitoring tools, the purpose of monitoring, and the period for
which monitored data will be retained. The policy should also be
attached to individual employment agreements and approved by each
employee with his signature. The fourth type of consent is one which
conforms to a valid judicial definition.167
There are two types of employee consent with regard to the details of
the violation of privacy: (1) general consent to a policy, and (2) specific
consent to each instance of monitoring.168 Is implied consent sufficient
for authorizing monitoring data from social networks by employers?
Courts have stated that under the private party consent to
surveillance provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA), consent does not have to be explicit: it may be
implied.169 In a case involving a claim of implied consent under this
subject, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained that
“implied consent is ‘consent in fact’ which is inferred ‘from
surrounding circumstances indicating that the [party] knowingly
agreed to the surveillance.’”170 “Thus, implied consent—or the absence
of it—may be deduced from ‘the circumstances prevailing’ in a given
situation.”171 This decision does not align with the main argument of
167. See id. at 14 (delineating between implied consent, express consent, and
express consent provided by “each party”). But see YOAN HERMSTRÜWER & STEPHAN
DICKERT, TEARING THE VEIL OF PRIVACY LAW: AN EXPERIMENT ON CHILLING EFFECTS AND
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 3 (2013) (arguing that consent to disclosure of personal
information creates a risk of a chilling effect that increases people’s propensity to
comply with social norms and “induce[s] them to forego benefits from norm
deviations,” such as the exercise of civil liberties).
168. See Jolls, supra note 154, at 63 n.195.
169. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(b), 100 Stat. 1848, 1850 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2012)); Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st
Cir. 1993); see also Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 757 (N.D. Ohio 2013)
(“Negligence is, however, not the same as approval, much less authorization. There
is a difference between someone who fails to leave the door locked when going out
and one who leaves it open knowing someone [will] be stopping by.”).
170. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116–17 (1st Cir. 1990) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987)).
171. Id. at 117.
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this Article. Indeed, to secure the necessary “private zone” as justified
by psychological reasoning presented in this study, the adoption of
more restrictive levels of consent would be preferable.
Relying on a policy of consent bears risks as employees are likely to
sign any agreement in order to be employed.172
Therefore,
employers should consider informed and express consent when the
broader policy includes components for securing a privacy minimum
that will not be subject to contractual waiver. This would be a
significant change from the prevailing legal reality in which implied
consent is, in many cases, sufficient.
Knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be
considered implied consent. In Deal v. Spears,173 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held an employee did not impliedly
consent to monitoring of her phone calls when her employer only
told her that it might monitor phone calls.174 Similarly, in Lazette v.
Kulmatycki,175 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
concluded that there was no reason for the plaintiff to predict that
her employer would monitor future e-mail messages sent from her
personal Gmail account.176
Furthermore, employees should not be penalized for refusing their
employers’ requests to monitor their data in social networks, a
concept some states have codified through laws prohibiting
employers from asking for employees’ private passwords.177
3.

Inspection, the right to be heard, and the right to appeal
All data gathered legitimately should be reported to the applicant
and employees. Following notification, employees must have the
right to explain, comment, and even appeal.
4.

Proportionality and reasonability
Rights of employers and the constitutional right to freedom of
speech conflict when employers seek data in digital spheres about

172. See Jolls, supra note 154, at 11 (noting cases in which employees consented to
polygraph and drug tests as prerequisites to employment).
173. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
174. See id. at 1157 (finding the possibility of monitoring insufficient to infer
implied consent).
175. 949 F. Supp. 2d 748 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
176. Id. at 757–58 (“Random monitoring is one thing; reading everything is another.”).
177. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing the state action in response
to concerns of employer’s overreaching by requesting prospective employees for their
Facebook passwords and providing an example from the State of Washington).
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employees or applicants. The “proportionality” test and the “least
restrictive means” specifically provide an example for an alternative
legal tool that can help policymakers.178 Proportionality analysis has
evolved over the past fifty years and “is today an overarching
principle of constitutional adjudication . . . [and] the preferred
procedure for managing [certain] disputes . . . as a multi-purpose,
best-practice standard.”179
“The core of necessity analysis is the deployment of a ‘leastrestrictive means’ test” in which the court “ensures that the measure
does not curtail the right any more than is necessary . . . to achieve its
stated goals.”180 The idea behind this principle is simple. When
there are two or more ways to safeguard a legitimate employer
interest, the permissible infringement upon a right would be the
one that achieves the interest in the least restrictive, least offensive
way. The policy that better protects the right will be adjudicated as
the proper one.181
Applying this constitutional principle to the workplace context, in
both the public and private sector, a least invasive means analysis
should be the applicable test for maintaining virtual privacy of data
posted on social networks. If an applicant’s curriculum vitae (CV),
interview, or any other data provided voluntarily is available as a
means for ascertaining the candidate’s qualifications, then violating
privacy in order to gather this information (even from public
spheres) would be impermissible. A proportionality rule such as this
could be implemented quite efficiently with respect to employee
privacy. Employers should limit incursion of employee “private
zones” to legitimate circumstances in which severe and immediate
damage may be caused to the employer’s legitimate interests (such as
harmful criminal activity by an employee) when there are no other
alternatives available to achieve the same goal. Invasion into
employee privacy may only take place to the extent that there are no
178. See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS 10–11 (Doron Kalir trans. 2011) (exploring four components of
proportionality: proper purpose, rational connection, necessity, and proportionality
stricto sensu).
179. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008) (opining that
“proportionality-based rights adjudication now constitutes one of the defining features
of global constitutionalism, if global constitutionalism can be said to exist at all”).
180. Id. at 75.
181. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 803 (2011) (discussing the
American “narrow tailoring” test (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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other less invasive alternatives to achieve the same result, and if
proportional, measured in light of the potential harm to the
employees. Employers should also use the least invasive technology
available. For example, legitimate software can provide alternative
sources of data that are less invasive than human monitoring of
information posted on social networks.182
Tracking of any data on employees or applicants beyond the
business context should be considered an invasion of privacy.
Information must only be tracked for specific, clear, and legitimate
purposes. Employers should not use information gathered from
monitoring for any purpose other than the purpose for which the
monitoring was performed.183
5.

The European approach to privacy in the workplace
This final subpart discusses some global trends that have
contributed to recent shifts in U.S. legal norms toward the notion
that more private zones within virtual spheres ought to be secured for
employees and job applicants.
Europe enjoys one of the most protective privacy systems based on
the European Convention on Human Rights,184 the Council of
Europe Convention 108,185 various European Union (EU) instruments,
and case law from the European Court of Human Rights and the
Court of Justice of the European Union.186 There is no specific EU

182. Ariana Levinson, focusing specifically on the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act, provides a detailed analysis of limitations courts have placed on intrusive
practices, both within and outside the context of employment law. See generally Ariana
R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for
the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 467–69 (2012).
183. See id. at 525 (interpreting the requirement in the Wiretap Act that employers
are not to circumvent code-based restrictions to prevent “voyeuristic” employers from
using information without a legitimate business purpose).
184. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (outlining the right to respect for private and
family life, home, and correspondence).
185. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, art. 5, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108.
186. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS & COUNCIL OF EUR.,
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 3 (2014) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW]. The European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights and the Council of Europe jointly prepared this handbook for the purpose of
serving as the main point of reference in this field. Id. (“With the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU became legally binding, and with this the right to the protection of personal data
was elevated to the status of a separate fundamental right.”).
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legal framework that governs data processing with respect to
employment. In the Data Protection Directive, employment relations
are specifically referred to in Article 8, which concerns the processing
of sensitive data.187 With regard to the Council of Europe, the 1989
Employment Data Recommendation188 is currently being updated.189
A few of the following recommendations serve as core principles of
European law, as set out by the Council of Europe Committee of
Ministers’ Employment Data Recommendation:
(1) Personal data collected for employment purposes should be
acquired from individual employees directly.190
(2) Personal data collected for recruitment must be limited to
information necessary to evaluate candidate suitability.191
(3) Judgmental data must be based on fair and honest evaluations,
must not be “insulting” in its formulation, and must be made in
accordance with principles of fair data processing and data accuracy.192
(4) Employees should be informed about the processing of their
personal data, including the purpose of processing, the type of
personal data stored, the entities to which data is regularly
communicated, and the purpose and legal basis of such
communications. Employers also should inform employees in advance
about any automated systems for the processing of personal data or for
monitoring the movements or the productivity of employees.193
(5) Employees have a right of access to their employment data as
well as a right to rectification or erasure. If a judgment is issued on
the basis of data, employees have a right to contest the judgment,
although these rights may be temporarily limited for the purpose of
internal investigations. If an employee is denied access to review
data, or is unable to rectify or erase the data, the Council of Europe
recommends that national law requires appropriate procedures to
contest such denial.194
(6) Consent is a significant legal basis for processing employment
data, but there is awareness of the economic imbalance between

187. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1, 10 (EC).
188. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, On the Prot. of Personal Data Used for
Emp’t Purposes, Recommendation No. R (89)2 (Jan. 18, 1989).
189. HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 186, at 171.
190. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, On the Prot. of Personal Data Used for
Emp’t Purposes, Recommendation No. R (89)2 § 4.1.
191. Id. § 4.3.
192. Id. § 5.3.
193. Id. § 3.1.
194. Id. § 12.1–.5.
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employers requesting consent and employees giving it.
The
circumstances surrounding a request for consent should be carefully
considered when assessing the validity of such consent in the
employment context.195
(7) Even when data is relevant, there are limitations on its
collection. For example, employers may ask employees or job
applicants about their state of health or conduct medical
examinations only if necessary to assess suitability for employment, to
fulfill requirements of preventative medicine, or to grant social
benefits. Health data may not be collected from sources other than
from the employee concerned except when express and informed
consent is obtained or when national law so provides.196
The European approach emphasizes the widening gulf between
U.S. and European data protection laws and creates challenges for
multinational businesses and other organizations operating in
Europe. For example, the European Court of Human Rights
expanded the basis of protection for personal data in the workplace
by ruling that Internet monitoring of employees, even for the sole
purpose of analyzing web sites visited including date, time, and
duration of visits, violated Article 8 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.197
According to this attitude, business e-mail, Internet usage, and
telephone calls affect the private lives of employees and may contain
personal information that is protected by data protection laws.
French courts have held that finding erotic photos on an employee’s
desk was insufficient to justify a search of the entire computer, only
195. Id. § 10.1; see also Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on a Common
Interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, at 11,
2093/05/EN, WP 114 (November 25, 2005) [hereinafter WP 114] (inviting
employers to use more than just consent of their employees to transfer data to
ensure valid consent was given considering the hierarchical relationship of an
employer and employee).
196. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, On the Prot. of Personal Data Used for
Emp’t Purposes, Recommendation No. R (89)2 § 10.2–.6; see WP 114, supra note 195,
at 15–16 (discussing an exception to this rule in the case of medical necessity).
197. Copland v. United Kingdom (No. 62617/00), 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 322,
326, 332 (2007) (“The applicant alleged that the monitoring activity . . . amounted to
an interference with her right to respect for private life and correspondence under
Article 8, which reads as follows: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.’”); see Fred H. Cate, European Court
of Human Rights Expands Privacy Protections: Copland v. United Kingdom, AM. SOC.
INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/21/
european-court-human-rights-expands-privacy-protections-copland-v-united
(asserting that Internet and e-mail monitoring by employers is generally prohibited).
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to discover a personal file that contained downloaded pornographic
images that gave the employer cause to terminate the employee.198
Accordingly, courts have found that the existence of particularized
suspicion that an employee was freelancing on company time while
using company resources alongside the existence of an explicit
policy are irrelevant.199
Unlike Western Europe, which has robust employee privacy
protection even in the private sector, the U.S. does not.200 This
Article challenges the wide gulf between these two parts of the world
and asks: should it be so wide?
V. A SHIFT TO A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE: SECURING A VIRTUAL
“PRIVATE ZONE”
A. Legislation Forbidding Employer Access to Employee Social Media
With increasing numbers of people using social media both at and
away from their workplaces, employers seeking information about
employees or applicants have started asking for usernames and
passwords for personal social networks and e-mail accounts.201
Employers have justified such requests by arguing that access to
personal accounts is needed to protect proprietary information or
trade secrets, to comply with federal financial regulations, or to
prevent the employer from being exposed to legal liability.202
However, policymakers throughout the U.S., in accordance with the
position expressed in this Article, have considered requiring access to
personal accounts to be an invasion of employee privacy. Since 2012,
legislative bodies in many states have begun creating laws to prevent

198. See Cate, supra note 197 (summarizing the French high court’s rationale that
the erotic photos “did not present the type particular risk that could justify the
search of the computer”).
199. See id. (discussing a case from the Court of Cassation).
200. See Yohei Suda, Monitoring E-Mail of Employees in the Private Sector: A Comparison
Between Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 209, 209,
212–13, 240, 249 (2005) (asserting that various factors contribute to the difficulty in
the United States to provide more robust privacy protections, including the lack of
recognition that privacy is a fundamental right, private companies’ lack of trust in
the government to protect employee privacy, and the precedence given to explicit
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as First Amendment rights, at the
expense of implicit rights to privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
201. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 94.
202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.200 (2013) (permitting employers to request
social networking content under certain circumstances, including, inter alia, for
investigations into employees stealing trade secrets).
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employers from asking or forcing employees to disclose passwords to
personal accounts.203 Some states have enacted similar laws to protect
students, primarily in public colleges and universities, from being
forced to provide the school access to their social networking
accounts.204 It is impressive that legislation has been initiated in at
least twenty-eight states in 2014, and as of September 2014, twenty
states have enacted legislation of this type.205
For example, Washington State’s bill concerning personal social
networking accounts passed unanimously by both branches of the
state legislature and was signed into law. This law bans employers
from requesting or requiring any employee or prospective employee
to submit any password or other related account information in order
to gain access to the individual’s personal social networking website,
account, or profile.206 Pending legislation in New York similarly
“prohibit[s] an employer or educational institution from requesting
or requiring that an employee, applicant or student disclose any . . .
means for accessing a personal account or service through specified
communications devices.”207
In California, “[e]xisting law prohibits a private employer from
requiring or requesting an employee or applicant for employment to
disclose a username or password for the purpose of accessing
personal social media, to access personal social media in the presence
of the employer, or to divulge any personal social media.”208
California law also “prohibits a private employer from discharging,
disciplining, threatening to discharge or discipline, or otherwise
retaliating against an employee or applicant for not complying with a
request or demand that violates these provisions.”209 A current bill

203. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 94
(providing examples of bills in California, Connecticut, and Georgia).
204. Id. (providing examples of bills in Hawaii and Rhode Island).
205. See id. (listing Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin as having enacted legislation of this type
in 2013 and 2014); Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, 2012
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-tosocial-media-passwords.aspx (listing California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland,
Michigan, and New Jersey as having enacted legislation of this type in 2012).
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.200(1).
207. S. 02434D, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
208. Assemb. B. 25, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
209. Id.
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would apply these provisions to public employers as well.210 Directing
these provisions toward the private sector might be justified because
public employees are operating within protections not always
applicable to private sector employees.211
Similar legislation has failed in states such as Texas, North Dakota,
and West Virginia.212 Nonetheless, the legislative initiatives in so
many states represent significant progress and recognition of the
complexity of relations within workplaces and the right of
employees to privacy within virtual spheres. These state laws have
the potential to substantially increase privacy protections of
employees concerning social networking. On the other hand, these
laws might be difficult to implement in workplaces where employees
agree to explicit but also implicit demands.
The main problem persists where the laws “do not limit an
employer from accessing social media” either on its own or through
an individual.213 Moreover, even the most progressive legislation does
not differ from common law rules that rely specifically on the
traditional expectation of privacy test (which may not be fulfilled in a
“closed” social networking group that does not include the
employer’s representatives). Therefore, these tools cannot be
applied to a social network profile that is not limited to a very specific
group or to data posted by third parties. Privacy is not viewed as an
absolute human right.214 In the same manner, the taking of
information from open social networks should be protected to a
certain level and, hence, at least partially limited.

210. Id.
211. See William A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and Public
Sector Labor Law, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 427, 434 (2013) (arguing that “a de jure regulatory
structure for government employment is necessary to check the powers of the state
and partisan politics”).
212. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 94
(noting four failed bills in Texas, one in North Dakota, and one in West Virginia).
213. Herbert, supra note 211, at 433.
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.01 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2012) (“It is well recognized that the right to privacy is not an absolute right, but is
rather a set of . . . interests that the common law protects against wrongful intrusion
by others . . . . [T]he basic claim of [wrongful] invasion of the employee right of
privacy [by employers] requires not only (a) an intrusion upon the employee’s
protected privacy interest, but also that (b) the employer intrusion upon that interest
is highly offensive in scope or manner.”).
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B. Court Decisions in Favor of Employee Privacy
Recent U.S. court decisions have deviated away from the traditional
legal inclination to validate firms’ policies by upholding employees’
expectations of privacy in data posted within virtual spheres. Even
though these court decisions do not always refer to tracking data on
social networks, they pertain to other “realms” within the virtual
world used by employees (such as private e-mails) that share in some
aspects the same logic and are applicable to the study.
In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp., the plaintiff
asserted a common law invasion of privacy claim alleging
unauthorized access of her private Facebook post about the
Holocaust Museum shooter in which she expressed a personal
view.215 One of the questions discussed was whether an employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook posts.216 The
plaintiff argued that “she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
her Facebook posting because her comment was disclosed to a limited
number of people who she had individually invited to view a restricted
access webpage.”217 The defendants argued that there cannot be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a comment disclosed to many
people.218 The court ruled that the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation that her Facebook posting was private because she ensured
her privacy settings protected her page from public view.219
In 2010, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted another proemployee privacy decision and opposed an employer’s explicit
policy.220 The employee was provided a company laptop computer
for business purposes.221 The employee was allowed to use the laptop
for company e-mails and to use the Internet through the company’s
server.222 Without the employee’s knowledge, a copy of every
Internet page the employee visited was saved onto a “cache” folder on
her computer’s hard drive.223 The files remained on the hard drive
unless they were manually deleted or overridden.224 The employee

215. 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372 (D.N.J. 2012).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 374.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010) (finding
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the plaintiff’s personal e-mail account).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 655–56.
224. Id. at 656.
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communicated to her attorney about her situation at work through
her personal Yahoo e-mail account, where she entered her password
and user information.225 After returning her laptop, she filed a
complaint alleging harassment and other claims.226
The defendant employer hired a computer forensic expert to
retrieve data from the plaintiff’s laptop in preparation for
discovery.227 The defendant’s attorneys discussed and analyzed the
data that was retrieved by the forensic expert.228 The company
argued that it had the right to review the information according to
its written and well known policies.229 The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that the employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the correspondence, affirming the Appellate Division’s
ruling that the employer had violated the employee’s privacy by
reading and using the documents.230
In another case, Lazette v. Kulmatycki, the plaintiff worked for
Verizon, which provided her with a phone for business purposes and
for her personal use.231 After the plaintiff stopped working for
Verizon, her supervisor read over 48,000 of the plaintiff’s personal emails via the phone Verizon had given to her.232 The court held in
favor of the employee’s right to privacy, ruling that the employer had
no right or authority to read the plaintiff’s personal e-mails.233 The
fact that the plaintiff had used a company phone to access her

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 657 (“The proffered Policy states, in relevant part: ‘The company
reserves and will exercise the right to review, audit, intercept, access, and disclose all
matters on the company’s media systems and services at any time, with or without
notice. . . . E-mail and voice mail messages, internet use and communication and
computer files are considered part of the company’s business and client records.
Such communications are not to be considered private or personal to any individual
employee. . . . Abuse of the electronic communications system may result in
disciplinary action up to and including separation of employment.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
230. See id. at 663–64 (noting that the employer’s policy did not give a reasonable
person any cause to anticipate that the agent would be looking over the employee’s
shoulder as the employee opened private e-mails on her private account.).
231. 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 757–58 (holding that negligently leaving access to a personal
account is not consent, nor is knowledge that the employee’s e-mail will be
monitored considered implied consent).
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personal e-mail did not give her employer automatic authority to
access and read her private e-mails.234
Even more cases reflect this pro-employee privacy tendency. In
Smith v. Hillshire Brands,235 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas limited the extent to which litigating parties can demand
access to Facebook accounts for purposes of pre-trial discovery.236
Magistrate Judge O’Hara did not accept the defendant’s position on
the relevancy of the discovery requests and denied the argument that
everything is relevant.237 The judge used Facebook posts as an
example claiming that not every post involved in the decision to
terminate the plaintiff is relevant.238 Thus, employers are not entitled
to access employees’ social networks and other forms of
communication, such as personal e-mail, because this is equivalent to
a search of tangible objects in a plaintiff’s home.239
These cases, like the legislative initiatives described earlier,
represent significant progress in the discourse on employee privacy in
the workplace with respect to electronic media.
While not related to social media and employees, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently issued what has been referred to as a landmark
opinion regarding privacy rights, clearly demonstrating a shift toward
recognizing the importance of privacy in the digital age. In Riley v.
California,240 the Court unanimously held that a cell phone may not
be searched or seized without a warrant.241 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote about the pervasive use of smart phones:
Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of
sensitive personal information with them as they went about their
day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all
that it contains, who is the exception. . . . A decade ago police
officers searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled
across a highly personal item such as a diary. . . . Today, by contrast,
it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than [ninety
percent] of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the
mundane to the intimate. Allowing the police to scrutinize such
234. See id. at 758 (advising that having access to the plaintiff’s e-mails does not
mean that the plaintiff gave implied consent for her employer to read them).
235. No. 13-2605, 2014 WL 2804188 (D. Kan. June 20, 2014).
236. Id. at *1, *4–5.
237. Id. at *4–5.
238. Id. at *5.
239. Ogden v. All-State Career Sch., 299 F.R.D. 446, 450 (W.D. Pa. 2014).
240. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
241. Id. at 2485.
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records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing them to
search a personal item or two in the occasional case.242

Nonetheless, the status of protection for employee and prospective
employee personal data as published within social networks and
other sources remains far from ideal.243
CONCLUSIONS
Social networks are public digital environments where people can
gather via mediating technologies. They support social interaction244
by allowing users to create personal profiles, identify lists of
associates, send messages, and participate in discussion forums.245
Denying or diminishing this virtual sphere can be equal to and as
drastic as forbidding a person from speaking, as these mechanisms
are the digital era’s basic means of communication. Nowadays,
other alternatives are not viable and therefore cannot be considered
“real” alternatives.
Privacy in social networking is an emerging, but underdeveloped,
area of case law.246 There appears to be some consistency in the case
law on the two ends of the privacy spectrum. On one end of the
spectrum, cases hold that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy for material posted to an unprotected website that anyone can

242. Id. at 2490 (citations omitted).
243. See, e.g., Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Kimble, No. 13-0810, 2014 WL
2404322, at *1–4 (W. Va. May 30, 2014) (upholding a school district’s dismissal of a
school employee who had posted pictures to her MySpace account of herself
cavorting in a hot tub with students). The students were topless and the employee
had captioned the photograph with the derogatory term “hoes,” a slang term
meaning “whores.” Id. at *1. The appellate court, overturning a lower decision that
reversed the employee’s dismissal, found this language to be evidence of immoral
behavior. Id. Moreover, the court found that the employee had no expectation of
privacy because the photo was taken in the context of the employment—even though
the photograph was taken off of school premises and not during school hours—
because it was taken in the context of an activity (albeit an unsanctioned one)
involving the students entrusted to the employee for an overnight trip. Id. at *2–4.
244. See Adam N. Joinson, ‘Looking at,’ ‘Looking up’ or ‘Keeping up with’ People?
Motives and Uses of Facebook, in 1 CHI 2008 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1027, 1028
(Margaret Burnett et al. eds., 2008), available at http://digitalintelligencetoday.com/
downloads/Joinson_Facebook.pdf (contrasting social media from “old media”).
245. See Boyd, supra note 49, at 1 (creating a public forum for kids to be seen as
cool in school).
246. See Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between
Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 13 (2011)
(discussing the undefined legal boundary between public and private
communications on social networking websites).
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view.247 On the other end of the spectrum, cases hold that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy for individual password-protected
online communications.248 U.S. courts, however, still use traditional
tests and rely either on the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard or on contract law governing company policy statements.
The most deep-seated problem of all is the societal attitude and
consequential legal posture, which has yet to develop a consistent
opinion or coherent approach toward data posted with restrictive
measures (e.g., defined as private or aimed at a specific group of
“friends”). Although most courts hold that a communication is not
necessarily public just because it is accessible to a number of people,
courts differ dramatically regarding how far this theory extends.
What is clear is that privacy determinations are still made on a caseby-case basis in light of all the facts presented.249
A different perspective on the issue of employee privacy concerns
the question of the legal rules regarding employers as a database
holder. Employers collect a lot of information about their employees
and keep it in their possession. New legal rules should address
questions like: Who can hold this data? Where can it be held it and for
how long? What data can be stored? Who can have access to the data?
Should employees be aware of this data? And so on and so forth.
As the new era of international commerce gives rise to new
considerations, the answers to questions about the right of employees

247. See United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002), rev’d
on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[I]t strikes the Court as obvious that a
claim to privacy is unavailable to someone who places information on an indisputably,
public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any measures to protect the
information.”); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that privacy was lost when private information was posted on a publicly
accessible Internet website and “[a]ccess to [the publication] was not protected”).
248. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d
548, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in personal, password-protected e-mail messages stored on a third party’s server
even though the employee had accessed that outside server while at work).
249. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 939 (2005) (explaining that most courts have adopted the concept of “limited
privacy,” which is “the idea that when an individual reveals private information about
herself to one or more persons, she may retain a reasonable expectation that the
recipients of the information will not disseminate it further”). Compare Multimedia
WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493–94, 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that
the plaintiff’s disclosure of facts over the air did not render them public), with
Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding that the plaintiff’s disclosure of facts to two coworkers deprived her of a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
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to private virtual zones also emerge through multinational firms.
American companies abroad and foreign firms located throughout
multiple countries might incorrectly assume that American policy
prevails. This could result in breaches of local policy regarding
privacy in the workplace.
In many of the social network intrusion cases, the main
justifications for legitimate invasion in employees’ privacy are
inapposite. Neither the employer’s “need to examine the work of the
employee to determine the quantity, quality, and timely provision of
service” nor the claim that “employers generally own and control the
workplace and its instrumentalities”250 can justify using personal
information in social networks per se. It is time for American
employment law and social policy to catch up with the reality of the
virtual sphere and to permit employees, whether current or
prospective, to enjoy privacy within their social network without fear
of intrusion or professional reprimand over private matters.

250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
No. 5, 2012).

OF

EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.01 cmt. b (Tentative Draft

